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• This report presents the results of analysis on compulsory contracts or 
mandatory written contracts (MWCs) applied within the dairy sector of 
European countries, looking into their impact and how they currently 
operate. This evidence will allow stakehodlers to come to an informed view 
as to their likely suitability and application in Scotland.  
• The purpose of this study is threefold:  
a. to provide an overview of the current dairy landscape in Scotland. This 
part of the work comprises a quantitative overview of the Scottish dairy 
sector structure based on available data and; 
b. to provide an overview of how these contracts are structured and 
operate in selected representative countries in Europe. As part of this 
work, case studies for six countries were constructed for: France, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain; 
c. to compare the Scottish sector with that of countries where MWCs are 
in operation; to examine and assess how MWCs could be applied in 
Scotland and likely impact of doing so and recommend to both industry 
and the Scottish Government steps to maintain the industry's long-term 
future. 
 
Overview of the current dairy landscape in Scotland 
 
Structure of the industry in Scotland 
 
• Scotland produces about 1.5 million litres of milk (around 9% of the UK 
milk production) and about 43% is in the hands of cooperatives. The 
evolution of the Scottish and the Rest of UK production is similar.  
• The top 5 processors account for around 94% of the all milk collection – 
with the top 2 accounting for around 56%. Farmers’ production depends 
strongly on them due to the exclusivity of milk delivery. 
• Almost 80% of the milk collected in Scotland is used for drinking milk and 
cheese (most of which is Cheddar). Both markets are very competitive at 
the retail level, which is the main market destination. 
• Milk production is seasonal, increasing in spring and decreasing in autumn. 
Information by processor shows that not all of them see the seasonal 
variation in milk collection (e.g., maybe due to contracted milk explains a 
lower proportion of the processors’ need and the remaining is completed 
with milk purchase on the spot market). 
• Prices paid to farmers for different milk uses (except between 2015-16) 
have a very close evolution. This is due to the fact that milk does not have 
differentiate utilisation. The reflection of this is that milk is considered 
commodity and its price follow the international price of traded commodities 




• Milk uses by processor are in very competitive categories: drinking milk 
and cheese. The retail market is highly competitive, with private labels 
being an important category in both product category. Processors supply 
retailers with branded and private label product because the need to 
produce at full capacity to reduce their cost per unit of output. 
 
Dairy contracts in Scotland 
 
• Contracts are usually open ended (“evergreen”) with processors generally 
committing to purchase all the milk produced on a farm (i.e. exclusivity) 
during the period of the contract.  
• Notice periods for pricing agreements are generally long, from a minimum 
of three months to up to 12 months required from the farmer to the 
processor, with sometimes longer notice periods required from the 
processor to the farmer. 
• Farmers’ participation on the negotiation of contracts depends on the type 
of organisation i.e., whether it is a co-operative, a private company 
negotiating with a producer organisation, formal representative framework 
set up for the purpose or through dialogue at ad-hoc meetings. Similarly 
happens with the resolution of conflicts. 
• Base prices in contracts are depend on commodity markets’ prices (e.g., 
skimmed milk powder, cheese, butter). 
• Prices paid to farmers tend to consider the following elements: valuation of 
the milk by constituent content (e.g., butterfat, protein), quality 
requirements, pricing adjustments for milk quality, volume collection, 
transport, farm management practices.  
• Because of the competitive environment faced by processors, price 
clauses in contracts between processors and suppliers have historically 
been built around flexibility, i.e., the use of what is termed ‘purchaser 
discretion’, which means that a processor (milk purchaser) has the right to 
vary the price paid to farmers as and when they see fit. 
 
Comparison of dairy sector features in the studied countries 
 
• The following table compares the features of the dairy sector in each one 




Comparison of dairy sector features in the studied countries 





54 40 68 74 3 36 
Farming and processor Little product 
differentiation. Contracts 
are evergreen, exclusive 
and price can change 
under  ‘purchaser 
discretion’. Price based 
on commodities price. 
Several Producers’ 
organisation (POs) sell 
to a processor. 5 year 
contracts and follow the 
Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) 
rules with variety of price 
arrangements. Farmers’ 
union are politically 
strong.  
POs negotiate on 
behalf of farmers. 6 
months contracts. 
Follow CMO rules. 
Similar contracts 
operated before 2012. 
Imports of milk to 
drinking milk and 
other products. 
Important proportion 




cheeses. POs pool 
the milk and manage 
the logistics. 
Contracts are 1 year 
and follow CMO 
rules. 
Law does not set a 
minimum length 
contract and the 
conditions  are left to 
negotiation (although  
they comply with the 
CMO rules). Processing 
cooperatives are 
important and private  
processors are 
multinationals 
Large milk informal 
market. Introduction of 
contracts aimed to 
formalise the sector. 
Producers are very 
small (about 3 cows). 
Minimum length is a 
year. All sales of milk 
must be covered by a 
contract. 
The price can be 
either fixed, variable 
or a mixture. 
Contracts offered 
from the largest 
processors are 
dominated by fixed 
price (around 70%). 
Processor and retailer Lengths of contracts 




private labels and 
branded products. 
Branded are very 
important (75% of the 
market). Negotiation of 
branded and private 
labels. Processors also 
produce private labels 
where the have very low 
margins, Retailers 
negotiate jointly against 
processors. 
Strong retailers, mostly 
multinationals importing 
dairy products. 
Reputation of brands 
help on negotiations 
and provide some 




but brands are 
important (represent 
quality to 
consumers)   
Big retailers are 
multinationals and have 
negotiation power over 
processors. 
Retailers are 




Organisations Only 1 producer coop 
(MSA) 
70 POs and an 
interbranch organisation 
(IBO). Currently only 
processors and 
producers, farmers’ 
union but not POs. 
POs and IBO (includes 
producers, processors 
and retailers). 
48 POs and no IBO. No POs or IBO. 
However, have an 
institution that checks 
that contracts are 
complete according to 
the CMO. 
Created POs were 
transformed into 
cooperatives. No IBO 
8 POs (cow’s milk) 
and IBO (producers 
and processors). IBO 
keep record all the 
contracts and 
produce indicators for 
the sector. 




Introduction of mandatory contracts and farm price volatility 
 
• The impact of the implementation of MWCs (under the EU agricultural 
Common Market Organisation (CMO) regulation) on raw milk price volatility 
was investigated in twelve member states using time series models.  
• Results showed evidence that in France, Hungary, and Slovakia milk price 
volatility decreased after the implementation of MWCs.  
• However, in the rest of analysed countries were varied, with raw milk 
prices’ variance either found to be constant (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, and Romania) or to vary in a non-significant manner over 
the period studied (Lithuania, Slovenia and Spain).  
• The above results can be due to a variety of causes such as that written 
contracts were commonly used before the 2012 Milk Package or the fact 
that CMO regulation included not only prescriptions about the introduction 
of MWCs but also other recommendations (e.g., implementation of dairy 
farmers’ PO and IBOs).  
 
Comparison of Scotland and countries where MWCs have been applied 
 
• The aim of the CMO rules was to improve stability in the EU dairy sector by 
promoting better contractual relationships and addressing the imbalance of 
bargaining power between farmers and first purchasers. 
• Whilst there are points in common in the dairy sector of each country, such 
as retailers are the stakeholders with most significant negotiation power; 
there are substantial differences amongst all of them, which makes 
analysing and comparing them methodologically challenging. This also 
speaks positively about the adaptability of the CMO rules behind MWCs to 
the different business environments. 
• None of the studied cases pointed out that MWCs brought problems for 
their dairy sectors and in at least one case (i.e., France) processors were 
grateful that the exclusivity clause was eliminated as part of the 
introduction of MWCs. 
• Establishing MWCs may bring an initial cost for the industry to adapt their 
current contracts and practices but it may increase the transparency and 
certainty for dairy farmers. 
• However, there are important factors to consider regarding the 
implementation of MWCs: 
o It is important to consider their structure together (e.g., volumes, pricing 
and contract length) instead of analysing each clause independently 
and keeping the other aspects unmodified.  
o Under the current market structure, characterised by highly vulnerable 
processors due to their products’ portfolio and changes in their costs of 
production, it is not feasible to introduce pricing mechanisms and 





o An example of the above could be the case of a contract between a 
processor and farmers, where the conditions are a contract length of 
year (i.e., the conditions of the contract cannot change during that 
period), the price paid to farmers depends on the international price of 
skimmed milk powder (SMP) through a formula, and the farmers deliver 
all the milk they produce to the processor (i.e., under exclusivity). If the 
price of SMP increases dramatically, it will encourage farmers to 
produce more and the processor will face a substantial increase on the 
total costs of milk and will need to dispose the excess of milk without 
necessarily having a market for it.  
o There are at least two ways to reduce the processor’s vulnerability in 
the above example: one way would be to consider a contract where the 
exclusivity clause is eliminated and replaced by an agreed in advance 
schedule of milk delivery (i.e., agreed volumes). The second way, would 
be to maintain the exclusivity clause but replace the price formula by a 
type “A&B” pricing, where the processor would pay price A for an 
agreed volume of milk and much lower price for any milk delivered in 
excess of the agreed volume. The low price should discourage farmers 
to produce in excess.  
o The elimination of the exclusivity clause worries some processors that it 
will create them problems to ensure a reliable supply of milk. The 
observed abroad experiences indicate that processors operate without 
any problem by asking farmers to state in the contract their expected 
quarterly or monthly milk supply for the contract period (e.g., a year), 
also including clauses that allow for deviations from those values and 
penalties in case of very significant deviations. 
o Note that the effectiveness of the A&B pricing depends on the reaction 
of the supply to the set prices. If the B price is set too high, low cost 
producers may still over deliver. 
o The introduction of POs can be a good way not only to improve the 
bargaining power of farmers but also to organise milk supply for 
processors. 
 
Recommendations for the Industry 
 
• The motivation of this study was the results of the consultation on the 
formal extension of the GCA’s remit to cover primary producers (February 
2018), which announced to introduce legislation governing contracts 
between producers and purchasers (i.e., MWCs) to provide extra 
transparency and certainty for dairy farmers by setting out minimum terms 
within a contract.   
• In general, the study does not find reasons why the MWCs cannot be 
applied to the Scottish dairy market. However, the specific conditions need 
to be negotiated between the parties:  
o To avoid excessive exposure of processors to risk and therefore 




clauses should be considered together with pricing and minimum 
contract time duration. 
o Thus, one option would be to eliminate the exclusivity clauses and 
replace them by agreed volume to be delivered. 
o Given the seasonality of the production annual contracts are probably 
the most suitable duration of the contracts (evergreen contracts can be 
negotiated by the parties).  
o Farmers commit on contracts a schedule of quarterly or monthly 
volumes, with deviations negotiated. 
o Another option would be to consider a pricing mechanism of the “A&B” 
type, while maintaining the exclusivity clause. 
o Written offers in advance (i.e., a formal offer is sent to the producer say 
two months in advance of the contract termination date) can be useful to 
avoid difficulties to producers trying to terminate their contracts within a 
reasonable period (e.g., if significant changes to prices or the terms of 
contracts are proposed.) 
o The pricing scheme chosen (i.e., fixed, formula or a combination of 
both) is also subject to negotiation and might depend on the duration of 
the contracts. The industry can benefit of encouraging POs. For 
farmers, they can provide bargaining or at least greater help with 
understanding the details behind the contracts. For processors they can 
provide an organised way to collect milk reducing transaction costs. 
o In addition, establishing an IBO, bringing together all the stakeholders, 
would be useful for the industry as it will allow them to discuss supply 
chain issues. It could be a way to develop collaboration on the dairy 
supply chain.  
 
Recommendations for the Scottish Government 
 
• Encourage the formation of POs led by negotiators with skills and 
experience and are able to gain the trust of farmers. A strategy for this 
needs to be established with probably the Government supporting 
financially the starting of the POs, although they should be supported by 
the farmers. 
• Encourage the industry to create an IBO, with the participation of all the 
stakeholders i.e., farmers, processors and retailers, to discuss dairy supply 










1.1 In order to understand the current policy environment surrounding the 
discussion on mandatory written contracts (MWCs) one should go back to the 
proposal introduced by the European Commission (EC) in 2010 in preparation 
for the elimination of milk quotas in March 2015.   
 
1.2 Uncertainty over the impacts of the abolition of milk quotas in 2015 
coupled with a period of intense price volatility in 2007–09 led the European 
Commission to establish the High-Level Experts’ Group (HLG) on Milk in 
October 2009 (HC-EFRA, 2011). Based on the HLG reports in June 2010 and 
December 2010, the European Commission released its proposal on 
‘Contractual relations in the milk and milk products sector’ (i.e., the ‘Milk 
Package’) (European Commission, 2010), where it stated that the problems of 
the dairy sector were: 
 
• Inadequate price transmission along the chain, in particular as regards 
prices received by farmers. 
• The value-added in the chain had become increasingly concentrated in the 
downstream sectors, notably with dairies. 
• The volume of milk to be delivered during the season was not always well 
planned and there was a potential lack of adaptation of supply to demand 
as farmers were obliged to deliver all their milk to their buyers. 
• There was a lack of widespread use of formal, written contracts containing 
basic elements and made in advance of delivery (e.g., lack of clear pricing, 
where in some cases, those buying milk were able to change the price at 
short notice, or even retrospectively without the option of a farmer stopping 
to supply milk to that buyer).  
 
1.3 The Milk Package proposal put forward the following four 
recommendations (with the new rules applying only until 30 June 2020): 
 
1. Member States could opt to make it compulsory for dairy producers and 
processors to provide farmers with written contracts specifying a price or 
price formula, the delivery volume, the duration of the contract and the 
timing of collections. 
2. Dairy producer organisations (POs) would be allowed to be established so 
they could jointly negotiate contract terms, including price, as long as they 
do not exceed 3.5% of EU production or 33% of national production by 
volume. 
3. Interbranch organisations (IBO) could be set up across the supply chain to 





4. An explicit legal basis for Member States to allow for the collection of 
information from processors on raw milk deliveries on a monthly basis. 
 
1.3 The House of Commons - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee (HC-EFRA) (2011) discussed the EU proposal and highlighted that 
the forthcoming abolition of quotas, coupled with growing global demand for 
dairy products, was creating a window of opportunity for UK dairying; 
moreover, UK milk production was increasing for the first time in nearly ten 
years. However, despite the surge in global food prices, milk prices remained 
below the average cost of production, threatening the ability of some dairy 
farmers to continue producing and indicating serious issues of price 
transmission.  
 
1.4 HC-EFRA recommended written contracts should specify either the raw 
milk price or the principles underpinning price, the volume and timing of 
deliveries, and the duration of the contract. They concluded that it would be 
essential for the new form of contract to be made compulsory, otherwise there 
would be no improvement in the system. In addition, they agreed with the 
principle of increasing farmers’ negotiating power through enabling producer 
organisations to jointly set prices with processors, although they 
recommended that national competition authorities should be required to 
approve the formation of producer organisations that cover over 20% of 
national milk production to avoid distortions of competition.  
 
1.5 The Committee also insisted that Defra should take more proactive 
steps to increase investment in processing and reduce farmers’ production 
costs, including supporting innovative research and development. As large-
scale dairy holdings were a significant future development for the industry, 
and could raise issues beyond the responsibility of planning authorities, Defra 
must establish its position on large-scale dairying. 
 
1.6 Low milk prices in 2012 created financial difficulties for UK dairy 
farmers, particularly in the summer of 2012, when processors announced a 
series of milk price reductions to be implemented at short notice. Although 
some of these price cuts were subsequently withdrawn, ministers from the UK 
administrations worked with industry representatives to help secure an 
industry-led solution, which resulted in September 2012 in the signing of a 
voluntary code of practice for contractual relationships between dairy 
processors and producers inspired by the measures of the Milk-Package 
(Dairy UK et al., 2012). As of March 2013, it was estimated that 85 per cent of 
British milk was bound by the principles of the voluntary code. A report 
published in March 2013 by the House of Commons – Welsh Affair Committee 
(HC-WAC) (2013) concluded that: 
 
• The new voluntary code of practice was an important step forward to 




and purchaser. All dairy processors who have not yet signed the voluntary 
code should do so. 
• The code must be given time to work. The UK Government should set out 
precisely when and how it intends to measure the success or failure of the 
voluntary code. 
• Should the voluntary code fail in its objectives, the UK Government must 
legislate for a statutory code of contracts in the dairy industry.  
 
1.7 A 2014 review of the Voluntary Code of Practice (‘Code’, hereafter) 
chaired by Alex Fergusson, MSP, identified a high degree of commitment to 
the continuation of the Code. It stated that where it had been used most 
effectively it had benefitted both the producer and processor; however, more 
needed to be done to get the wider industry to appreciate all of the potential 
benefits. The review put forward seven recommendations: 
 
1. The current notice of termination should remain unchanged. 
2. The Code should clarify that a 30 day notification of a price change is only 
required in the case of a price decrease. 
3. A good practice clause should be written into the Code to ensure that the 
producer is fully aware of the details of any new contract they are 
considering. 
4. The wording in the Code, regarding early termination/payment of liquidated 
damages, should be changed. 
5. Contracts should allow a producer to supply other purchasers where they 
wish to expand their production and the purchaser does not want to 
purchase the additional milk under the contractual terms and conditions, or 
where there is a ceiling on total volume of milk to be delivered within a 12-
month period. 
6. There should be wider adoption of the Code, with the possibility of 
expanding it to include retailers, whilst maintaining the voluntary nature of 
the code. 
7. The Code should include a requirement for DairyUK, NFU and NFUS to 
meet at least every 6 months to review progress and engage in an on-
going dialogue on any code-related issues. 
 
1.8 In March 2015, dairy quotas were eliminated and milk prices were left to 
be determined by the market. The period after the elimination of the quota was 
characterised by a decreasing trend in the average price of milk (as observed 
in all EU milk prices across the EU). However, when disaggregated by milk 
contract prices, the results showed significant heterogeneity (with some prices 
rising in the period), reaching a gap between the highest and the lowest price 
of up to 18 pence per litre in August 2015, when the average price was 23.3 
pence per litre (Costa-Font and Revoredo-Giha, 2018). This situation raised 
concerns about whether the average milk price for the UK calculated by Defra 





1.9 In 2016, a formal call for evidence was launched by the UK Government 
to explore the case for extending the remit of the Groceries Code Adjudicator 
(GCA) beyond enforcing the Groceries Supply Code of Practice, and, for 
example, to cover relationships between farmers and processors. The 
consultation revealed a number of specific concerns for the dairy sector 
(which were already pointed out in the introduction of the Milk Package) such 
as:  
 
• problems with the balance of bargaining power in the groceries supply 
chain;  
• examples of unfair or unclear contract terms;  
• difficulties caused by late payments;  
• and a lack of trust and transparency that discouraged good relationships 
across the supply chain.   
 
1.10 It is important to note that most large retailers highlighted problems with 
extending the GCA’s remit and argued against any further intervention, 
warning that this could dilute its effectiveness by adding further 
responsibilities. There were also concerns about funding and doubts of how 
any extended role for the GCA could be delivered in practice (Farm Business, 
2018; ABC, 2018). 
 
1.11 In February 2018, the UK Government announced that a formal 
extension of the GCA’s remit to cover primary producers would not be 
appropriate, and instead, it would identify certain actions to address the main 
concerns. One of the announced actions was to introduce legislation 
governing contracts between producers and purchasers under Article 148 of 
the EU Commission (note that under the voluntary code, contracts are not 
subject to governance). The objective of legislating dairy contracts was to 
provide extra transparency and certainty for dairy farmers by setting out 
minimum terms within a contract.  These would include, at a minimum:  
 
• the price payable for the delivery of milk – expressed either as a static 
price or a formula;  
• the volume of raw milk to be delivered and the timing of deliveries;  
• the duration of the contract;  
• details of payment periods and procedures;  
• arrangements for collecting or delivering raw milk; and, 
• rules that apply in the event of force majeure  
 
1.12 Industry commentators believe that introducing mandatory written 
contracts (MWC) could help to reinforce the responsibility of operators in the 
dairy chain (farmers and milk buyers) and increase their awareness of using 




because MWCs aim to: i) ensure the presence of a contract and ii) specify a 
range of criteria that must be included.  
 
1.13 Note that currently, the European Commission gives Member States 
discretion as regards whether they should apply MWCs between dairy 
producers and processors for the delivery of raw milk.  The EC (2014) 
provided an update of the Milk Package implementation indicating that 12 
countries had adopted MWCs with different characteristics.  The latest 
information (as of 2016) indicated that Slovenia and Poland had introduced 
them since January and October 2015, respectively. In addition, there were 
some modifications of the positions taken as regards the mandatory contracts. 
Thus, Cyprus, which had introduced compulsory contracts in June 2013, 
modified its position by making them compulsory only for recognised producer 
organisation (PO) and associations of producers’ organisations (APO) and for 
a minimum duration of one year; since April 2015 contracts in Latvia were no 
longer made compulsory; and the minimum duration of the contracts in Italy 
was extended to one year. These changes brought the number of countries 
applying MWCs to 13. 
 
1.14 In the aforementioned context, the aim of this research project is to 
provide an analysis of the MWCs in European countries as there is currently 
limited evidence on the impact of these in the countries in which they currently 
operate. This evidence will allow Scottish Ministers to come to an informed 
view as to their likely suitability and application in Scotland. Specifically, the 
purpose of this study is threefold: 
 
1. To provide an overview of how MWCs are structured and operate in 
selected representative countries in Europe. As part of this work, case 
studies for six countries were constructed for: France, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Romania and Spain.  
 
2. To provide an overview of the current dairy landscape in Scotland. This 
part of the work comprises a quantitative overview of the Scottish dairy 
sector structure based on available data (e.g., Economic Report on the 
Scottish Agriculture, Milk Utilisation Survey and Kantar Worldpanel, AHDB 
dairy prices) and it also covers factors that affect farm gate prices, e.g., 
how farmers, processors and retailers work together to establish contracts 
considering the structure of these contracts, their duration.   
 
3. To compare the Scottish sector with that of countries where MWCs are in 
operation; to examine and assess how MWCs could be applied in Scotland 
and likely impact of doing so and recommend to both industry and the 
Scottish Government steps to maintain the industry’s long-term future. 
 
1.15 The structure of the report is as follows: it starts with an overview of the 




followed by a review of the evidence on dairy contracts in European countries 
based on six case studies. The next section discusses the similarities of the 
Scottish sector with that of countries where MWCs are in operation in order to 
analyse how these could be applied in Scotland and their potential impact. 
Finally, the report provides recommendations to both industry and the Scottish 










2.1 Structure of the industry 
 
2.1 The purpose of this section is to describe the business environment of 
the dairy sector in Scotland as well as the features of the contracts that are 
Key points 
• Prices paid to farmers follow trends based on commodity markets due to 
the fact the same milk can be used to produce different manufacturing 
products. 
• Based on 2017 figures almost 80% of the milk collected in Scotland is 
used for drinking milk and cheese (most of which is Cheddar). Both 
markets are very competitive at the retail level, which is the main market 
destination. 
• The retail market is highly competitive, with private labels being an 
important category. Processors supply retailers both their branded 
products and private labels. This may reflect both presence of install 
capacity (when producing only branded products) and decline of major 
brands.   
• Contracts are usually open ended (evergreen) with processors generally 
committing to purchase all the milk produced on a farm (i.e., exclusivity).  
• Notice periods are generally long, from a minimum of three months to up 
to 12 months required from the farmer to the processor, with sometimes 
longer notice periods required from the processor to the farmer. 
• Farmers’ participation on the negotiation of contracts depends on the 
type of organisation i.e., whether it is a cooperative, a private company 
negotiating with a producer organisation, formal representative 
framework set up for the purpose or through dialogue at ad-hoc 
meetings. Similarly happens with the resolution of conflicts.  
• Because of the competitive environment faced by processors, price 
clauses in contracts between processors and suppliers have historically 
been built around flexibility, i.e., the use of what is termed ‘purchaser 
discretion’, which means that a processor (milk purchaser) has the right 
to vary the farm gate price as and when they see fit.   
• Prices paid to farmers tend to consider the following elements: valuation 
of the milk by constituent content (e.g., butterfat, protein), quality 
requirements, pricing adjustments for milk quality, volume collection, 









2.2 The UK accounted for 9.7% of EU milk deliveries in 2017, i.e., 15.1 
billion litres, of which approximately 10% were in Scotland. UK exports of dairy 
products, converted into milk equivalent (ME) was 22.6% of the milk deliveries 
and  4.4% of EU dairy exports in ME (CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics for 
the dairy sector in the UK is presented in Table A.1 in the Annex. 
 
2.3 The latest information of the dairy sector in Scotland (2018) indicates 
that there 918 dairy herds (39 herds less than in 2017). They represents 
approximately 9% of the total UK herd and are mainly concentrated in the 
South West of the country. The number of dairy cows in Scotland has 
increased to just under 179 thousand cows (the highest since 1997). Figure 1 
shows compares Scotland and Rest of UK milk production and both follow a 
similar trend. 
 
Figure 1: Scotland and Rest of UK production of milk 2003-17 
 
Source: Defra and Scottish Government. 
 
2.4 One of the important issue on milk collection is the seasonality of the 
deliveries (i.e., the increase of milk deliveries in spring and the decrease in 
autumm). Figures 2 and 3 present a delivery index by major processors for 
2017 and 2018. Whilst some of the companies show the expected swing on 
deliveries others show very stable milk collection, which could be the reflection 



























































































































Figure 2: Scotland - Total deliveries index by selected processor - 2017 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Milk utilisation survey. 
Notes: From farms in Scotland and elsewhere. 
 
Figure 3: Scotland - Total deliveries index  by selected processor - 2018 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Milk utilisation survey. 
Notes: From farms in Scotland and elsewhere. 
 
2.5 Figure 4 shows the UK prices paid for milk from 2004 to 2018 for 
different type of contracts. After a break of their historical trend during the late 
2014 to 2016, prices have converged again to similar values despite their 
different uses. In addition, the figures shows that there are little differentiation 
on the prices paid for milk for different uses (i.e., same milk can be used for all 































































Figure 4: UK - Prices paid for milk 2004-18 
 




2.6 Although the number of dairy companies operating in Scotland is 
relatively large (97 according to the Milk and Dairy Products approved 
premises, 2018), as shown in Figure 5, the top five companies represented 
about 94% of the milk collection in 2017 with the top milk collector being 32% 
of the total milk.  
 
Figure 5: Scotland – Milk collection share by company - 2017 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Milk utilisation survey. 
 
2.7 In terms of milk use (see Figure 6), drinking milk represented about 41% 











































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Scotland – Milk collection share by product - 2017 
Source: Scottish Government, Milk utilisation survey. 
2.8 If one considers only the processing of drinking milk and cheese as 
shown in Figure 7 each company has different specialisation. Note that at the 
UK level from the total milk that goes to cheese, 72% is for the production of 
Cheddar (the information is not available for Scotland; however, it is expected 
the proportion to be similar). 
Figure 7: Scotland – Drinking milk and cheese milk utilisation share - 2017 
Source: Scottish Government, Milk utilisation survey. 
2.9 Figure 7 also highlights that processors that represent more than 90% 
of the milk collection in Scotland are very exposed to highly competitive 
markets, i.e., drinking milk and cheese (i.e., as pointed out by DairyUK, 
processors operate in an environment of intense competitive pressure and 
uncertainty over market returns). 
Retail market 
2.10 As most of the top processors operating in Scotland market their 
products across the UK, the relevant retail level is the UK level (or Great 




























































































































not possible to consider all the dairy products, the focus of this section will be 
drinking milk and cheese, which are the two products that collect most of the 
milk processed in Scotland. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the estimation of 
annual sales of drinking milk and cheese between 2013 and 2017. Drinking 
milk displays a decreasing trend, whilst cheese trend is stable. 
 
Figure 8: Great Britain – Drinking milk and cheese sales indexes 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
 
2.11 Table 1 shows the increasing importance of private labels (i.e., 
supermarkets’ own labels in contrast to branded products) on the drinking milk 
market (78% in 2017). Within the category, the most important product is non-
organic, semi skimmed milk private label (almost 47% in 2017). 
 
Table 1: Great Britain - Market shares – Drinking milk (percentages) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
 
2.12 Table 2 presents the market share of different cheeses. As in the case 






















Names 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Whole milk branded organic 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
   Whole milk branded non-organic 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0
   Whole milk private label organic 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0
   Whole milk private label non-organic 15.4 15.7 16.0 16.2 17.0
   Fully skimmed milk branded organic 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
   Fully skimmed milk branded non-organic 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.2
   Fully skimmed milk private label organic 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
   Fully skimmed milk private label non-organic 11.4 11.4 11.1 10.6 10.4
   Semi skimmed milk branded organic 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
   Semi skimmed milk branded non-organic 15.0 14.5 14.4 14.6 13.6
   Semi skimmed milk private label organic 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9
   Semi skimmed milk private label non-organic 45.6 46.0 46.0 45.7 46.9
   Other milk branded 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0
   Other milk private label 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Total branded 24.3 23.4 23.2 23.3 21.7




reaching 58% in 2017. Whilst Cheddar type private label cheese has 
maintained its share around 28%, branded Cheddar has shown a decreasing 
trend being replaced by ‘other cheeses’ (private label). 
 
Table 2: Great Britain - Market shares – Cheese (percentages) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
 
2.13 To appreciate the full picture is important to note that processors not 
only sell branded products but also private label ones (the proportion of price 
labels on the total production varies by processor). The economic literature 
(e.g., Mills, 1995) points out that processors manufacturing private labels in 
addition to their branded products could be due to either excess of capacity 
and/or brands with declining sales. Given the trends showed in Figure 8, 
branded products have declining trends. In addition, given the share of private 
labels on the drinking milk and cheese markets, it is highly probable that most 
processors (if not all) would be operating under excess of capacity without 
producing retailers’ brands. 
 
2.2 Scottish dairy contracts 
 
2.14 Although most of processors operating in Scotland were requested 
copies of their contracts in order to make a comparison only one of them 
provided it. Therefore, this section relies heavily on DairyUK’s contribution, 
which provides an overall description of contracts in the UK.  
 
Products 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Hard cheese - cheddar type branded Scottish 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
   Hard cheese - cheddar type branded non-Scottish 22.2 20.3 19.6 17.8 17.3
   Hard cheese - cheddar type private label Scottish 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4
   Hard cheese - cheddar type private label non-Scottish 27.1 28.3 26.9 27.4 27.5
   Other hard cheese branded Scottish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other hard cheese branded non-Scottish 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
   Other hard cheese private label Scottish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other hard cheese private label non-Scottish 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5
   Soft cheese branded Scottish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Soft cheese branded non-Scottish 10.7 10.9 10.8 10.0 9.1
   Soft cheese private label Scottish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Soft cheese private label non-Scottish 4.3 4.5 4.7 5.0 5.0
   Other cheese branded Scottish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other cheese branded non-Scottish 13.7 13.3 13.7 14.7 14.6
   Other cheese private label Scottish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Other cheese private label non-Scottish 18.8 19.8 20.8 21.7 22.8
Total branded 47.3 45.2 44.8 43.2 41.8




2.15 Generally contractual arrangements in the dairy industry are based 
around flexibility in pricing to cater for the volatile market the industry operates 
in combined with security of supply chain arrangements.  
 
2.16 Security of outlet and input is paramount to the successful operation of 
the dairy industry supply chain. Farmers need a secure continuous outlet for 
their milk. Raw milk is produced continuously during the year and it is a 
perishable product. Farmers do not have the storage capacity to keep more 
than a few days of production on the farm. The natural variability of milk 
production also gives uncertainty to the volume being produced. 
 
2.17 Processors need a secure continuous flow of raw milk. Processors 
likewise do not have the capacity to store a significant volume of raw milk. 
Processors require a continuous flow of product, to maximise utilisation of 
processing plant and to service markets, especially fresh product markets. 
Processors need to obtain raw milk as much as farmers have to sell raw milk.  
 
Offer contract and duration 
 
2.18 Milk processors are usually supplied by a large number of dairy farmers. 
As a result processors tend to use standardised contracts for all of their 
supplying farmers or groups of farmers. As pointed out by Dairy UK 
processors do not negotiate contracts individually with dairy farmers as it is 
impractical to do so. 
 
2.19 Because of the aforementioned reasons behind the operation of  
dairy farms and processors, contracts are usually open ended (evergreen). 
Notice periods are generally long, from a minimum of three months to up  
to 12 months required from the farmer to the processor, with sometimes 
longer notice periods required from the processor to the farmer. The length of 
notice periods is designed to: 
 
• Ensure processors can service long term contracts with their customers. 
• Give processors time to secure alternative sources of supply if dairy 
farmers resign. 
 
2.20 As regards farmer participation in determination of contracts, it differs by 
type of organisation:  
 
2.21 Co-operatives - Around 45% of Scottish milk supply is purchased by 
dairy co-operatives. Dairy co-operatives are under the ownership and control 
of dairy farmers and the content of contracts or their equivalent are 
determined within the governance structure operated by the co-operative. 
 
2.22 For private dairy companies the process by which contracts are 





2.23 Negotiation with representative organisations - Farmers supplying 
Lactalis are members of the Milk Suppliers Association. The MSA is a co-
operative. It does not purchase the milk of its members but it engages directly 
with Lactalis in determining milk prices. MSA is not registered as a Producer 
Organisation but its status as a co-operative provides it with exemptions in 
competition law that entitle it to participate in price discussions. 
 
2.24 Consultation through other frameworks - Some processors consult 
their supplying farmers through either a formal representative framework set 
up for the purpose or through dialogue at ad-hoc meetings. Farmers supplying 
Muller are organised in the Muller Milk Group. 
 
2.25 Overall, taking into account co-ops and other representative structures 
into account, a major portion of Scottish milk supply is operated under 
arrangements that provide a mechanism to consult the views of dairy farmers 




2.26 Processors (co-operatives or private companies) operate in an 
competitive environment, under uncertainty over market returns and do not 
have the resources to protect their supplying farmers from price fluctuations. 
As a result of these commercial pressures, price clauses in contracts between 
dairy processors and their supplying farmers have historically been built 
around flexibility. Very specifically this had led to the widespread adoption by 
milk processors of the use of what is termed ‘purchaser discretion’. This is 
where the processor (milk purchaser) has the right to vary the farm gate price 
as and when they see fit (Dairy UK). 
 
2.27 Overall, in conjunction with the processors commitment to buy all the 
milk produced by a farmer, this results in processors taking the volume risk 
whilst dairy farmers carry the primary burden of price risk. However, 
processors are not completely exempted from price risk. For instance, 
manufacturers of mature cheese can be particularly affected by the 
differences in raw milk costs and price paid for the finished product given the 
lengthy period of maturation (e.g.,two years).  
 
2.28 Prices paid to farmers tend to consider the following elements: 
 
• Valuation of the milk by constituent content (e.g., butterfat, protein) 
• Quality requirements 
• Pricing adjustments for milk quality, volume collection, transport etc. 







2.29 Processors are generally committed to purchase all the milk produced 
on a farm (i.e., exclusivity).  
Dispute resolution 
 
2.30 Dispute resolution also differs by type of organisation:  
 
2.31 Co-operatives – Complaints within a co-operative structure follow the 
procedures established by the co-operative.  
 
2.32 Negotiation with representative organisations - Contracts establish 
that in case of conflict a mediated solution will be sought. The disputes are 
treated by the board committee encouraging an agreed resolution, and then  
if an agreement is not reached again an agreement is sought through 
mediation. The aspiration is that the last decision on the dispute will remain 
always in the hands of the parties, not with a third party. Farmers that want to 
leave after a period notice. In addition, if the mediation fails the contract has a 
deadlock clause in which the farmer can move after a period elsewhere. 
 
2.33 Other frameworks – If the firm is relatively small there may not be any 
pre-established mechanism and the conflict solution may be left to left to the 
parties (i.e., processor and farmer) to discuss the problem. 
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
2.34 Whilst milk collection and their utilisation are gathered by the Scottish 
Government and Defra, dairy contracts are confidential. 
 
Contracts between processors and retailers 
 
2.35 Based on the interviews it was clear that the contracts between 
processors and retailers are varied in terms of clauses and duration (i.e., they 
change by retailer and product). 
 



























Prices negotiated along with other terms 
(marketing, distribution, etc). Contracts vary 
with retailer.  Retailers also buy private label 
from processors
EXPORTS
Although most of 
the product is sold 
on the domestic 
market
FARMERS
Paid in arrears. 1-1 relationship with 
milk buyer. There is only one negotiating 
cooperative in Scotland.
Relationship governed by  
contracts (most of the cases 
under the voluntary code)





Purchase milk from Cooperatives,  or farmers' direct supply
Prices vary according to 
commodity markets and 
purchasing discretion.























Prices vary according to 













3. Review of the evidence on dairy 





3.1 Compulsory formal contracts and producers organisations were 
implemented in France in 2010 (Decree N° 2010-1753 of 30 December 2010). 
The decree, which came into force on the 1st of April of 2011, was reinforced 
by the adoption in 2012 of the Milk Package and the recognition in April 2012 
of producers organisations (PO).  
 
3.2 According to Dervillé and Allaire (2014) and Trouvé et al. (2016) MWCs 
were introduced as a result of several issues: 
 
• The significant concentration of private companies on the French dairy 
sector. 
• The progressive elimination of quotas. 
• Competition issues around the role played by the French Dairy Interbranch 
Organization (CNIEL) in balancing the power relationships along the 
supply. 
• The distress associated to the bankruptcy of several dairies in 2009.  
• The limited collective bargaining of producers.   
 
Key points 
• Contracts were introduced to provide stability and transparency in the 
relationship between farmers and processors. 
• The contracts specify the quantities to be delivered to processors and 
the pricing formula in the case of private companies. The latter is not a 
fixed indicator but a set of negotiated indicators used within a formula. 
Whilst the components are in general known, the weight to each one of 
them is confidential and only known to the negotiated parties. 
• Cooperatives must also state the pricing elements within their contracts, 
but do not have the ability to restrict volumes, hence the widespread use 
of A/B style pricing. 
• Currently France is implementing to requirement to include an indicator 
related to costs of production (production and processing) in the pricing 
of milk. 
• There is some stability in the relationship between retailers and 
processors given by the use of negotiated annual contracts for branded 





3.3 As specified in Article L631-24 of the Rural Code and Maritime Fisheries 
on contracting in the agricultural sector, the main objectives of MWCs are: 
 
• To guarantee the relations between the individual producers and the 
processors. 
• To stabilise prices in the face of increased volatility risk. 
• To fight against the reduction of the price of milk from peripheral areas, 
specially mountain areas. 
 
3.4 There are two types of MWC: (1) individual "simple" contracts (i.e., 
individual producers and a processor), which are now a minority; (2) individual 
contracts signed by the members of the PO, supplemented by a collective 
agreement developed between the company and the PO. The contracts 
comprise by law seven mandatory components: the duration of the contract, 
the quality of the product, the volume of milk, the collection of milk, the price, 
payment and termination.   
 
3.5 Moreover, Article L631-24 aims also at strengthening the role of PO in 
the negotiation of contract terms, and to balance the relationship between the 
producers and the companies.  
 
3.6 The French law distinguishes two types of Producer Organisations: i) 
the commercial PO that, as the owner, sells the production of its members 
(i.e., there is transfer of ownership from the members to the PO); ii) and the 
non-commercial PO which collectively negotiating sales contracts on behalf of 
its members, markets their production but with no transfer of ownership.  
 
3.7 As of October 2015, 51 POs were recognised and represented 40% of 
volumes delivered to private dairies. Most POs are associations structured 
around dairy production sites. They are vertical POs with a regional dimension 
(i.e., formed by a pool of farmers selling to one processor) and note that 
larges processors dairies deal with multiple POs. Transversal POs are 
infrequent being France Milk Board the only case which encompasses three 
POs covering the entire French territory. 
 
3.8 Co-operatives in France are required to provide the same terms as in 
private contracts in terms of price (Lambaré et al., 2018). The use of contracts 
does not affect the duration or nature of the co-operative commitment to its 
members but does mean the terms and conditions by which the milk price is 
determined, and volumes are assessed is made explicit to members in the 
same way as in contracts offered by private dairies.  
 
3.9 Because of their status, co-operatives are compelled to take on all the 
milk of their members. As such, and unlike private processors, they cannot 




supply. This createsan issue for them around managing upstream volumes 
and keeping a balance between processing capacity and negotiated markets. 
As such, rules need to be defined  within the co-operative framework to deal 
with this issue (Trouvé et al. 2016). 
 
3.10 For the case of France, the implementation of the Milk Package did not 
require the establishment of an interprofessional association because the 
French dairy interprofessional association CNIEL was first created the 21st 
March 1974. It was a joint initiative of the three federations representatives of 
the dairy milk professional assembly Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de 
Lait (FNPL), la Fédération Nationale des Coopératives Laitières (FNCL) and 
the Fédération Nationale de l’Industrie Laitière (FNIL). However, in January 
2014, la Confédération Paysanne was incorporated as a new member. It is a 
private organisation with 40 million euros of annual budget. Funded by a 
mandatory fee paid dairy farmers (70%) and processors (30%), proportionate 
to the milk volume produced /processed.  
 
3.11 Between 2010 and 2012, French Dairy Interbranch Organisation 
(CNIEL) positioned itself as a facilitator for contractual procedures. It 
elaborated a guide to good practices and created an Interprofessional 
Commission on Contractual Practices (CIPC), However, the CNIEL mission is 
weakened due to the lack of consensus between its parts.  All decisions must 
be taken by unanimity of all its members: farmers, dairy cooperatives and 
private groups.  
 
Offer contract and duration 
 
3.12 The contracts consist of written and compulsory commitments between 
milk producers and their buyers for a minimum five-years (seven years for 
new entrants). In the absence of a reference to the renewal conditions in the 
contract, these are considered as being evergreen contracts for a period 
equivalent for which it was initially signed but with the possibility of termination 
under 12-month notice.  
 
3.13 Article L631-24 recommends to include in the contracts a restrictive list 
of reasons for termination by default. The contract would thus be considered 
as indefinite except in cases of force majuere for particular reasons under 
judicial control. In the case of non-renewal, the purchaser needs to notice the 
producer no less than three months in advance. The mandatory clauses of the 
contract also relate to the volumes and characteristics of the milk to be 
delivered and the methods of collection of milk. These elements are specified 








3.14 The volumes, after the elimination of the quota, were established based 
on the former quotas. Contracts specify the obligations, except in exceptional 
circumstances  provided in the contract, to the seller and the purchaser. In 
particular the conditions of access to the milk, the frequency and the time-
frame of collection, the conditions for the removal of the milk and the 
procedure established for sampling and measuring the quality and 
composition of the milk. At each removal of milk, the quantity collected shall 
be notified by the purchaser to the producer in the form of a delivery order. 
 
3.15 On the interviews it was clear that contracts did not contain exclusivity 
clauses. This is due to the fact that a processor deals with several POs (e.g., 




3.16 All contracts must contain a milk price or a price formula to indicate the 
monthly price to be paid (ALTA, 2017). Contracts most often use the 
indicators provided by the CNIEL as a reference. This can at times be adapted 
by region to allow for variations in markets. For the case of co-operatives, a 
system of double (or triple) pricing linked to  volumes produced is often used. 
The contract always needs to specify the criteria and modalities taken into 
account for the determination of the basic price of milk. The indicators most 
often selected are those established by CNIEL such as:  
 
• Index of industrial products of milk powder and butter 
• An indicator related to export cheese prices for Gouda, Edam and 
Emmental 
• An indicators of the level of consumption in France 





3.17 When there is a conflict or question related to the trade relations 
between producer and purchaser of cow milk, there is an institution named the 
Médiateur des Relations Commercials which is free of charge and has a 
preventive role. Mediations are carried out by an independent group made of 
one mediator and three delegates, and cover all agricultural sectors.  
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
3.18 To facilitate contractual negotiations within the food sector, the 




2010. The aim of the organisation is to track prices at different stages of the 
industry and to determine the margin between the stages of the suply chain. 
This is done using public statistical data.  Note that the outputs are publically 
available as well so everybody can track the margins. 
 
Processors and retailer relationships 
 
3.19 In France, retailers have significant negotiation power. This is increased 
by the fact that they are allowed to jointly negotiate with processors. The main 
reason behind this is that the competition authority is keen to maintain low 
prices for consumers. This is also the reason why the Processors’ Association 
is not allowed to participate in contract’ negotiations. 
 
3.20 Negotiations between processors and retailers are in two forms: (1) 
negotiation for national brands, which occurs annually from November to 
February and (2) negotiation for private labels. The margins are tighter in the 
second case due to the higher substitutability of products. Private label has a 
much smaller markets share, with only 35% of all the milk products sold at 
retail level.  Brands account for 65% of the market. In the case of UHT milk, 
however 70% is private label. 
 
3.21 Branded products are sold to retailers on 1-year contract where price 
and volume is agreed. Private label products are be sold on indefinite 
contracts, in which case prices tend to remain fixed until one party to the 
contract asks for a renegotiation. This requires a 3 month notice period if a 
higher price is to be implemented.  However, if the retailer re-negotiates a 
lower price, this is often implemented immediately. The longer term contract 





3.22 Farmers are relatively happy with the contracts. Although the strucutre 
of French contracts has limited their ability to expand (they cannot sell what 
they want), this was not a big change from the quota situation and  most 
understand that volume management helps to  support the price.  
 
3.23 The main benefit to processors, excluding cooperatives, is they are no 
longer required buy all the  milk delivered to them. This reduced their volume 
risk and helps with planning capacity.  Previously, they were obliged to buy all 
volumes delivered while still paying a price indexed to market movements.  
Cooperatives have dealt with the volume issue by implementing differntial 
pricing. 
 
3.24 The pricing mechanism in contracts is currently being modified to 




ensure income stability for farmers, but also provide support to processors in 
their negotiation with retailers as they will be able to pass on any additional 
cost. Before this is applied it needs to be approved by the European 
Commission. 
 
3.25 Diagram 2 presents a summary of the presents the structure of French 
dairy contracts along the dairy supply chain. 
 







There are two types of 
negotiations with processors: (1) 
branded products and (2) private 
labels. Prices are negotiated along 
with other terms (marketing, 
distribution, etc). Prices generally 
do not change during term of 
contract.






because it is a 
negotiation tool.
FARMERS
All receive the conditions negotiated by their 
producer organisation. They are supported by 
farmers' union which are politically very strong.
Relationship governed by 5 year 
contracts (7 years in the case of 
new entrants)
• Price (variable)
• Quantity (limited by the 
contract but in general
tend to accept all)
• Quality
PROCESSORS
Processors negotiate with several producers' 
organisations. In terms of quantities, they allowed a 
deviation of 5% with respect to the agreed volumes. 
Prices vary through contract 
period on basis of market 
indicators/indexes agreed by 
seller/buyer. Neither the IBO nor 
the Processors' Association 
participate in the negotiation
Cooperatives have similar 
contracts as the private sector 
but the board decide the prices.
• Price 




















Cooperatives use A&B (in some 
cases even C, which is very 
low) pricing because the accept 










3.2 Hungary  
 
 
3.26 It has been suggested that a common feature of pre-socialist regimes in 
transition to liberal economic systems, has been the initial inability of their 
public institutions to properly enforce contracting agreements. This uncertain 
legal-business environment, resulted in producers and processors of milk, 
who may struggle to establish long-term relationships based on formal 
agreements, opting instead for oral agreements or using spot markets 
(Bakucs, et al., 2013).  
 
3.27 The Milk Package was implemented in Hungary in December 2012, 
making mandatory the use of written contracts for the marketing of raw milk 
between producers and first purchasers of milk and establishing a minimum 
contract duration of six months (European Commission, 2016). A survey from 
members of the Hungarian Dairy Product Council (HDPC), which accounted 
for 75% of the Hungarian milk quota, found that approximately 72% of its 
members sold their milk under a written contract (Bakucs, et al., 2013).  
 
Offer contract and duration 
 
3.28 The contracts consist of written and compulsory commitments between 
milk producers and their buyers for a minimum of six months. However, 
information from interviews suggest contracts are often of longer terms, 
anywhere from 1-3 years or  evergreen. Contracts can be ended with  notice 




3.29 Volumes are specified within contracts, with farmers providing 
information on volumes to be delivered within a set period (monthly, quarterly 
Key points 
• The introduction of contracts was not a dramatic change to the industry 
as they were already in wide-spread use before the Milk Package. 
• Processors adapt pricing within contracts to their final markets and offer 
farmers a specific set of conditions (e.g., pricing alternatives) for their 
choice.  
• Volumes expected to be delivered are declared in advance and 
tolerances are negotiated between the parties. 
• POs play a role in balancing the negotiation power of farmers and 
purchasers and on mediation. Key on this is the competence of the head 
of the producer organisation. 
• The IBO also plays a role as a place for discussion. It brings all the 





or annually). Depending on the processor, there are tolerances around these 
volumes of between 5% to 15%, which are often negotiated.  Deviations 
beyond the agreed limits generally incur a penalty. 
 
3.30 Not all the contracts include exclusity clauses.  In some cases, farmers 
can sell milk elsewhere but only directly to consumers and only up to 25% of 




3.31 The pricing used is adapted by processors according to their 
businesses, i.e., there is plenty of discretion in the way that the pricing is set. 
One of the interviewed processors set prices two months ahead. They are 
conservative on their pricing and they do not reflect the peaks and troughs 
observed on the market price. Nevertheless, they follow the average market 
price. In addition of the base price, there are premia for fat, protein and 
bacteria content. Price is lagged to keep in line with market and to help 
smooth price for farmers. 
 
3.32 Another processor provides farmers with a choice of pricing options, 
using Hungarian market prices, the EU28 average price (or prices in 
neighbouring states) and spot market pricing. These indicators will then be 
used  for the length of the contract. They offer farmers a set of 5-10 indicators 
in different combinations and around 20 ‘pricing’ choices to the farmer. The 
models offered to farmers are managed to align with relevant product markets 




3.33 There a no centralised or formalised dispute resolution authority in 
Hungary. According to the interviewed producer organisation, the contracts 
contain the seeds of conflicts resolution. If the processor is not satisfied (e.g., 
due to a quality issue) then he would complain to the producer organisation. 
They would send the milk to an independent laboratory for check of quality. If 
the contract is not fulfilled then there would be a penalty. For amendments to 
the contracts the parties come first to the producer organisation. 
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
3.34 It was considered by all the interviewees that contracts increased 
market transparency. Contracts remained confidential between parties and the 
interbranch organisation (as in France) does not participate in negotiations. 
However, it plays an important role in bringing producers, processors and 
retailers together to align the interests across the supply chain. The 
interbranch organisation membershop covers 80% of raw milk production, 





3.35 In addition, the interbranch organisation plays a role in the collection of 
publicly available data (product balances for raw milk, wholesale and retailer) 
and also is involved with the generic promotion of Hungarian dairy products. 
 
Process of introducing the mandatory written contracts 
 
3.36 Due to the lack of the tradition of trading between producers and 
processors during the Communist period, contracts were widely ued pre-
accession. Processors indicated that the introduction of mandatory contracts 
did not cause any dramatic changes.  Similar contracts were alreay in place 
before the Milk Package and there exists a good level of trust between 
farmers and buyers in the Hungarian dairy industry. The biggest change 
resulting from the legislation was the requirement to use formula pricing. 
 
Processors and retailer relationships 
  
3.37 Processors and retailers do not have annual contracts. Sales to retailers 
are genearlly done on a short term basis, typically for around 1-6 months. 
There are 6-8 big retailer operating in Hungary, most of which are 
multinationals such as Tesco and Auchan. These companies posses strong 
market power due to their size and their ability to  import dairy products. 
Negotiations between processors and retailers are frequent and often 
influenced by spot market pricing. One of the processors indicated that some 
stability in pricing is obtained from providing a  differentiated product; products 
such as UHT milk obtains only low margins. If the product is well known to 
consumers it increases processors barganing power. 
 
The role of the POs on the contract negotiation 
 
3.38 The interviewed PO’s head was a former officer of the ministry of 
agriculture and also former IBO manager (i.e., he has excellent knowledge of 
the legislation). The role of the PO is to negotiate better contracts for its 
members. It does not own the milk and the contracts are between each farmer 
and the processor. 
 
3.39 The PO was formed because farmers came to him asking for help. The 
formation of the PO took some time as farmers needed to see the benefits. It 
occurred when farmers needed to deal with a crisis of low milk prices and 
wanted to improve the competition for milk. Its formation was helped by 
getting the Government to require membership in a PO to qualify for 
subsidies. Once farmers saw the benefits of ‘group negotiations’, more wanted 
to join.  
 
3.40 According to him the main benefits of the PO are increased 






3.41 The use of mandatory contracts, including the use of established pricing 
formulas and other pricing mechanisms  seem to operate well and producers 
and processors do not have negative views as regards the contracts. The only 
disruptions that were observed were due to the behaviour of some retailers 
introducing imported dairy products at very low prices. In this situation, the 
IBO (helped by members) have been useful to solve the problem. 
 
3.42 Diagram 3 below summarises the structure of the dairy contracts in 
Hungary.  
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3.3 Italy  
 
 
3.43 The provisions of the Milk Package were implemented in Italy by the 
Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies (MIPAAF) through the 
Ministerial Decree (M.D.) N. 15164 on the 12 October 2012. This Decree 
regulated the organisations of producers, their associations and inter-branch 
organisations; the negotiation of contracts for raw milk delivery; and the 
regulation of the PDO and PGI cheese supply. 
 
3.44 The aforementioned Decree established a criteria for the recognition of 
POs, requiring a minimum quantity of marketable production. This meant the 
POs must  demonstrate they have a mandate from each member, lasting 
three years, for not less than 75% of the arithmetic mean of the quantities of 
milk delivered in the last two years by the single producer.It was also 
established that producer of milk could only join one PO. 
 
3.45 For IBO in the milk and milk products sector to obtain recognition, in 
case of organisations at national level they must prove they account for 25% 
or more of the of the economic activities of the sector. For organisations 
operating in a single economic area, the threshold is 51% with respect to the 
area and 15% at national level. Currently, there is not an IBO for the dairy 
sector in Italy. 
 
Offer contract and duration 
 
3.46 The Italian law on contracts governs the marketing of raw milk between 
producers and processors at the national level. The development of this 
national legal context was the result of negotiation/consultation between the 
Italian Government and the main institutional representatives of processors 
(ASSOLATTE) and producers (CONFAGRICOLTURA, COLDERETTI, CIA). 
 
Key points 
• The structure of the Italian dairy sector is unique in the sense that a 
sizable proportion of the domestic milk production is dedicated to DPO 
cheeses, which provides regional differentiation of the milk. 
• The introduction of contracts did not affect the performance of the sector 
because they were already using similar contract. 
• Producer organisations negotiate the contract conditions on behalf of 
farmers, and market the milk to multiple buyers. Farmers receive a 
weighted average price obtained from all sales (the PO negotiates with 
and sells to several processors). 
• Producer organisations play an important role not only on the 
negotiation but also on the milk logistics (e.g., some cheeses can only 




3.47 With regard to the negotiation of contracts for the delivery of raw milk, 
recognised POs (or APOs) are entitled to negotiate and underwrite supply 
agreements on behalf of their members for all or part of the milk conferred.2 
 
3.48 Contracts for supply of raw milk with the first buyers in Italy must comply 
with all the elements required by the Milk Package (e.g., price to be paid on 
delivery, delivery volume and calendar, duration of the contract, resolution 
clauses). The minimum duration of contracts in Italy was extended in 2015 to 
one year. 
 
3.49 With regard to PDO and PGI production, the Milk Package provides 
that, upon request of Producer Organisations, Interbranch Organisations or 
Consortia of protection, the State may establish binding rules for a limited 
period of time regulation of the supply of cheese benefiting from a designation 
of origin protected or a protected geographical indication. The possibility of 
establishing these rules presupposes the existence of an "agreement 
concluded between at least two thirds of the producers of milk or their 
representatives representing at least two thirds of raw milk used for the 
production of cheese and, where appropriate, at least two thirds of producers 
of such cheese which represents at least two thirds of the production of this 




3.50 Based on information from the interviewed PO, it was indicated that 
members must provide an estimate of their production volumes. This is 
because the PO operates as a pooling agent, finding markets for members’ 
milk Producers can exceed the volumes by 3% to 5%. 
 
3.51 In terms of exclusivity, from the interviews it was pointed out that there 
are no specific clauses on the contracts saying that producers cannot sell to 
other processors; however, it was indicated that in practice this is not common 
practice.  This is partly a function of the high volumes of milk going through 




3.52 As pricing within contracts covers a period of a year fixed price options 
are not common.  Based on information from the interviewed PO, both fixed 
and index linked pricing are used. The most commonly used pricing system is 
                                         
2 The volumes of raw milk under negotiation cannot exceed the thresholds set out at 
Community level and, in particular that: i) the volume of raw milk subject to bargaining does 
not exceed 3.5% of production total of the Union; ii) the volume of raw milk subject to 
bargaining produced and delivered to a particular Member State does not exceed 33% of 




to use an initial base price which varies through the year according to an 
index. The index is linked to market prices, with companies seting their own 
mechanism or indexes. Commonly used mechanisms are average German 
prices, the price for Parmigiano Reggiano (most common DPO cheese) or a 
combination of market indexes. 
 
3.53 The contract with pricing based on indexes is more common for DPO 
products and fixed prices are more common for generic products which are 
then sold to retailers or merchants. The use of fixed pricing for the raw 
materials gives processors and merchant firmer grounds for negotiating with 
retailers and for achieving a price which provides them with a margin (e.g., 
often used for fresh milk/ soft cheeses). 
 
3.54 White cheese (i.e., the balancing product for milk surplus) is mainly sold 
as a commodity product  to wholesalers who package and re-sell it. These 
sales are often priced based on spot market prices (as they do not require 
regionally sourced milk) The spot prices are published weekly at a regional 
level by the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce sets prices 
through agreement of  supply chain participants who submit, then agree, the 
price. There are sub-commissions for liquid milk, butter and non-DPO cheese.  
 
3.55 Farmers are paid 30 days in arrears, at the end of each month. The 
price paid to the farmer is an average price (adjusted forbutterfat, protein and 
hygiene characteristics) achieved from all sales, weighted by volumes with a 




3.56 The role of the Government as mediator has been relatively poor. 2 or 3 
years ago they set a meeting to solve issues between producers and 
processors but without success. There is no really mediation. However, the 
Government (i.e., Ministry of agriculture) asks producers about every two 
month whether they are happy with the contracts. 
 
3.57 Information from the interviewed PO indicated that conflict resolution is 
written into the contract and there is no official body that checks the contracts 
– it is left to the industry. In addition, it was mentioned that there are in general 
good relationships between the parties. 
 
3.58 Although there are no special mechanism for mediation between the 
producers and processors in case of conflicts, in case of abuse of power it is 
the Italian Competition Authority (i.e., Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e 
del Mercato AGCM) that intervenes. An example of this happened when the 
main agricultural unions (e.g., Coldiretti) sent AGCM a report complaining of 
poor correlation between the consumer price of dairy products, the processing 




on 5 May 2015 consisting of a fact-finding survey on the dairy sector which 
closed on the 2 March 2016.  
 
3.59 The AGCM analysed the sector, taking into account both the legislation 
that prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuses of a dominant position, 
i.e., Article 62 of Decree Law no. 1/2012, bearing the "Discipline of 
commercial relations regarding the sale of agricultural and agri-food products", 
an as amended by Decree Law no. 51/2015. 
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
3.60 It was considered by all the interviewees that contracts increased 
market transparency. Contracts remain confidential and the Processors’ 
Association do not participate in negotiations. 
 
3.61 The consulting firm CLAL provides significant amount of information 
about the dairy sector in Italy and Europe. However, the specific indicators 
used for setting price within individual contracts are confidential to the parties 
to the contract. 
 
Processors and retailer relationships 
 
3.62 Processors sell primarily into retail channels; food service and exports 
account for a smaller share of sales. Retailers buy on medium to long term 
contracts (generally 12 months) which provide more security and stability to 
manufacturers. Nevertheless, retailers have substantive influence on prices 
paid to processors.  
 
Process of introducing the mandatory written contracts 
 
3.63 In the interviews it was stated that the introduction of mandatory 
contracts did not have an important impact on the sector due to the fact that 
they were already using contracts. The contracts were, however, shorter in 




3.64 A study carried out by AGCM (2016) on the dairy sector found that none 
of the sectors of the supply chain appear to be able to generate and 
permanently extract excessive profits to the detriment of milk producers. On 
the contrary, a high degree of competitiveness was found within retail 
markets. 
 
3.65 AGCM then highlighted that in these markets, significant price pressure 




trade and by the considerable presence of foreign brands and national brands 
that use foreign raw materials. 
 
3.66 In terms of relationships between processors and producers we were 
told that they are very good. The majority of farmers stay with the same 
buyers for long periods of time and generally have good relationships while  
prices are generally stable. 
 
3.67 Diagram 4 presents a summary of the structure of the dairy contracts in 
Italy.  
 






Prices negotiated along with other 
terms (marketing, distribution, 
etc). Prices generally do not 
change during term of contract
EXPORTS
FARMERS
Paid in arrears. 1-1 relationship with 
milk buyer. PO has a logistical role 
allocating milk according their use.






Purchase milk from Cooperatives, Associations, POs, or 
direct supply
Agree basis on which prices are paid
fixed or variable (and which indexes are used)
Prices vary through contract 
period on basis of market 
indicators/indexes agreed by 
seller/buyer
Relationship governed by 
cooperative board
• Price




















Prices vary through contract 
period on basis of market 












3.4 Poland  
 
 
3.68 The Polish Government considers agriculture to be one of the pillars of 
the country's economy, a source of jobs and wealth creation for rural areas. 
The country uses all the levers at its disposal (Stachowiak, 2014): 
 
• Almost 25% of the aid of the 2nd pillar has been transferred to the first 
pillar to support ' active ' agriculture; 
• 15% of direct payments are coupled aid, in particular towards livestock 
farming; 
• Redistributive payments for the first 30 hectares (about €41/ha) and 
support for young farmers. 
 
3.69 Compulsory contracts were introduced in Poland in October 2015. 
However, as stated by Trouvé et al. (2016) dairy contracts existed in Poland 
before the Milk Package reforms and were used by the Polish Government as 
a relatively effective way of protecting farmers from fluctuations in the price of 
milk and ensuring quantity and quality of milk deliveries to dairies.  
 
3.70 Despite the introduction of contracts in 2015 the Polish Minister of 
Agriculture was very critical regarding the measures of the Milk Package. He 
stated that the measures were not adapted to the Polish dairy sector, where 
the cooperatives dominate.  
 
3.71 Due to the aforementioned reasons the application of the Milk Package 
in Poland was made at a minimum level due to the opinion that Polish farmers 
would be very little motivated to join a PO due to the fact that they were not 
use to have freedom of choice and the predominance of cooperatives in the 
Milk collection.  
Key points 
• About 70% of the milk handled in Poland is done by cooperatives. 
Therefore, contracts only operate for the other 30%. 
• The introduction of the contracts did not have a big effect on the industry 
because as in other countries they were already operating under 
contracts. 
• In contrast with other countries, there is no minimum length of a 
contract. The contracts conditions are market determined. 
• The structure of the contracts in Poland follow the CMO and they need 
to specify the price, quantity, quality, length, payment terms, force 
majeure, conditions for acceptance and delivery. 
• The Agricultural Market Agency is in charge of verifying whether (1) the 
delivery of agricultural products is carried out based on a contract 
concluded in written, electronic or paper form; and (2) the contract fulfils 




Offer contract and duration 
 
3.72 The contracts apply to all the stages and to all the buyers from the 
producers. In the case of milk only raw milk is covered by the contracts. The 
contracts apply to all the forms i.e., written and electronic. If an email has all 
the elements of a contract, it is a contract. Contracts in Poland do not have a 
minimum length. The contracts conditions are market determined. There is no 
minimum length of a contract. Contracts need to specify the price, quantity, 
quality, length, payment terms, force majeure, conditions for acceptance and 
delivery. 
 
3.73 Each contracting party has the right to terminate the contract with a six-
month notice period. However, the processor has the right to terminate the 
contract with immediate effect if the milk does not meet the quality conditions.  
 
3.74 As regards milk testing the content of fat and protein are done at 
random, milk temperature as well as the total number of microorganisms, 
number of somatic cells, antibiotics / inhibitory substances, organoleptic 




3.75 Volume to be delivered is included on the contracts. The quantity is 
collected by processors. There is no obligation to sell all the milk to the 
processor (no exclusivity). Dairy cooperatives collect all the milk from their 
producers. 
 
3.76 The contracts do not carry an exclusivity clause, but are, de facto, 
exclusive within the term of the contract. If it is disclosed that the producer 
gives the contracted milk to another purchaser during the term of the contract, 
the processor has the right to dissolve the contract from the date of disclosure 
of that fact. In addition, the producer for the contracting entity must pay a 
contractual penalty of 3 months gross value for milk delivered to the 




3.77 The interviewes did not provide much information about how pricing is 
set up in the case of private processors except that it is market determined 
and they consider factors such as fat, protein and bacteria content. In addition, 
it includes additional payments for quality and deductions if the delivery of milk 
is lower than 200 litres. 
 
3.78 In the case of cooperatives, the price of milk is set for each month by 
the Management Board of the cooperative, depending on the quality of milk 









3.79 Most disputes arise due to the milk price. The Agricultural Market 
Agency is in charge of checking contracts in case there is a problem. They do 
not check all the contracts that are signed but those that are referred to them. 
 
3.80 In terms of the monitoring of contracts, they do so when they are:  
 
• based on a report, 
• based on other reliable source of information about violations 
• selected contracts based on a risk analysis. 
 
3.81 The Agricultural Market Agency verifies whether:  
 
• the delivery of agricultural products is carried out based on a contract 
concluded in written, electronic or paper form. 
• the contract fulfils the requirements specified by the Community and Polish 
law. 
 
Processors and retailer relationships 
 
3.82 According to the interviewees retailers have high negotiation power 
when negotiating with processors. Although they indicated that there seem to 
be contracts between retailers and processors, but none were sure about the 
conditions. Note that all the big retailers operating in Poland are multinationals 
(3 French Leclerc, Auchan, Carrefour, Lidl, Biedronka (Portuguese), Tesco 
and Kaufland). There are also Polish small retailers.  
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
3.83 It is important to note that about 70% of the milk in Poland is in the 
hands of cooperatives, therefore the contracts only operate on the remaining. 
There is no information disclosure unless there are issues with the contracts. 
The contracts are left to be negotiated by the parties. The Polish Government 
tried introduced a interbranch organisation but it did not progress. 
 
Process of introducing the mandatory written contracts 
 
3.84 In Poland, they already had contracts before the introduction of 
mandatory written contracts in 2015. According to them contracts did not 







3.85 None of the interviewed institutions indicated potential problems with the 
contracts. This may be due to the fact that contracts were already in operation 
before the Milk Package. 
 
3.86 Diagram 5 presents a summary of the structure of the dairy contracts in 
Poland.  
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3.5 Romania  
 
 
3.87 Before the implementation of the Milk Package in 2014, milk was 
marketed under verbal agreements that in most of the cases were very 
informal, and frequently triggered complaints from the producers. It mainly 
referred to changes to the price previously agreed. This circumstance along 
with the fact of a decreasing producing sector, stimulated since 2010 an 
increasing dialogue between processors and the government to attend to 
producers’ demands as to more stable and clear negotiated condition. 
Thereby, the Romanian implementation of the Milk Package included the 
imposition of mandatory written contracts (MWCs) for the marketing of raw 
milk. 
 
3.88 In addition, it is important to note that the Romanian dairy sector 
possesses a singular structure. Of a total production of 4.5 million metric 
tonnes only a bit less that 1 million tonnes are sent to dairy processing plants. 
The rest of the milk is either self-processed by producers and distributed 
through direct selling to consumers or self-consumed in farm. There is also in 
Romania a black market of milk that moves yearly around 800,000 tonnes of 
milk. The introduction of MWCs was used as an opportunity to reduce this 
black market. Using EU funds, a subsidy per declared tonne of milk was 
offered to producers, obtaining as a result a 50% increase in the amount of 
milk declared. 
 
Offer contract and duration 
 
3.89 The regulation is applied to the relationships between producers and 
first buyers of milk. It was agreed the minimum content that any milk contract 
should cover, namely: price (variable prices, fluctuating with the market, price 
fixed and not negotiated), duration, (minimum 6 months), quantity, quality 
(minimum standards and bonuses and penalisations), and payment methods. 
 
Key points 
• The Romanian dairy sector possesses a singular structure with only 
about a quarter of the milk production being sent to dairy processing 
plants. 
• The regulation is applied to the relationships between producers and 
first buyers of milk.  
• It was agreed the minimum content that any milk contract should cover 
is: price (variable prices, fluctuating with the market, price fixed and not 
negotiated), duration, (minimum 6 months), quantity, quality (minimum 
standards and bonuses and penalisations), and payment methods 
• POs and IBO failed in being established and given the disparities in 






3.90 Expected volumes are included in the contracts; however, the 
interviewees did not not know the details.  Note that given the aforementioned 
structure of the sector, processors do not face with the need of a balancing 




3.91 The common practice to establish the price currently in Romania, is to 
review the price for each natural production season (autumn and spring). That 
is reviewing the price or renegotiating the price twice a year irrespective of the 
duration of the contract (there are cases of 12 and even 24 months contracts). 
The Romanian average price roughly follows the EU price trend with a delay 




3.92 There is no mediation between farmers and processors. In practice, 
given the differences in scale between producers and processors if something 
happen it is not clear how the clauses of the contracts are enforced. 
 
Producers organisations and  Interbranch organisation 
 
3.93 As regards producer organisations two were set up in Romania after the 
implementation of the Milk Package. However, they were not successful in 
terms of joint negotiation with processors and both evolved into co-ops. 
 
3.94 The Romanian administration made several unsuccessful attempts to 
set up an interbranch organisation. They counted with the support of the 
APRIL, the processors’ association. The main issue is that producers 
organisation misunderstood the role of the IBO as one of setting prices.  
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
3.95 It was indicated in the interviews that the Romanian government has 
access to significant amount of information on the dairy market. There exists a 
register of first buyers of milk. Quantities sourced, prices, milk constituents 
(fat, protein), and supplier have to be reported. However, it was mentioned 







Processors and retailer relationships 
 
3.96 At the interviews it was indicated that most of the retailers were 
multinationals with important power of negotiation but the interviewees did not 




3.97 According to the interviews, given the structure of the Romanian dairy 
sector, contracts do not play a substantial role. Nevertheless, it is expected 
that they will continue operating as they add transparency to the relationships.   
 
3.98 Diagram 6 presents a summary of the structure of the dairy contracts in 
Romania.  
 
Figure 14: Diagram 6: Romanian dairy contracts 
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3.99 The Milk Package was implemented into the Spanish legislation in 2013 
(Ley 12/2013, and RD 1363/2013). It made mandatory the use of written 
contracts between producers and first purchasers for the marketing of raw 
milk. As part of this process, the Spanish inter-branch organisation 
(Organización Interprofesional Láctea – INLAC) was designed to play the role 
of coordinating the process of implementating the mandatory contracts. The 
main features of the Spanish legislation on mandatory contracts are as follows 
(Gobierno de España, 2015): 
 
Offer contract and duration 
 
3.100 The milk purchaser must make a written offer to the producer at least 
two months before the beginning of milk delivering. The offer must include all 
the elements of the contract with a minimum duration of 12 months, although 
the producer could ask for a shorter duration. This offer is meant to serve as a 
base for further negotiation of  contract terms. The negotiation should be 
freely negotiated between the parts in the contract.  
 
Key points 
• All sales of milk in Spain must be covered by a contract which specifies 
the milk price, volumes and term of the contract. Volumes must also be 
specified in the contract as well as delivery tolerances to be specified in 
the contract.  
• The price in the contracts can be either fixed, variable or a mixture of 
fixed and variable, but they are set for the duration of the contract. In the 
case of a variable price, the reference used to adjust prices must be 
specified in the contract and be verifiable from published data. Contracts 
offered by the largest processors are dominated by fixed price offers 
(around 70%).  
• Contracts must be offered to farmers for a minimum duration of 12 
months.  However, farmers can refuse the initial offer and agree a 
different length. 
• Variations to contracts within the contract term can be negotiated 
between parties but must be agreed in writing and notified to the 
Government Department responsible for monitoring the regulation. 
• Milk buyers retain discretion over the price level, as this is set at the 
beginning of the contract.   
• While initially met with resistance by milk buyers, both farmers and 
processors feel they have improved the situation in terms of improving 




3.101 Any contract may be agreed as renewable (i.e., rolling contracts or 
evergreen contracts) for similar length periods with a resignation period of two 
months. Whether the purchaser wanted to change the terms of the rolling 
contract, the new conditions should be sent in written to the producer at least 




3.102 The Spanish regulation establishes that the price agreed in the contract 
may be determined as either a fixed price, a variable price, that should be 
established through a price mechanism specified in the contract or a mixed 
one (part fixed and part variable).  
 
3.103 INLAC commissioned the University of Santiago de Compostela (USC) 
a thorough analysis of the Spanish dairy market in order to move forward the 
implementation process of the Milk Package.  
 
3.104 The USC experts concluded that the best way to protect supply chain 
stakeholders against market price volatility was the inclusion of non-linear 
price mechanisms within the contracts to establish the raw mil price. Classical 
economic theory assumes a linear relationship between changes in prices and 
quantities produced under the assumptions of perfect information and an 
efficient market structure that naturally tends to equilibrium between supply 
and demand. However, the Spanish raw milk market may behave quite 
differently and the reactions of the economic agents market signals may be 
not as efficient as predicted by the economic theory.  
 
3.105 Several factors may explain the efficiency problems in Spanish milk 
market: (1) operational difficulties to adapt production on the short term, what 
normally results in a lagged response, (2) high production investments entails 
high fixed costs, this may prompt opposite effects in front of a decrease of milk 
prices, triggering an increase in production as long as these are higher than 
the variable costs (Santiso Blanco, et al., 2014). In this context, the inclusion 
of benchmarking or referencing mechanisms was expected to enable enough 
flexibility for market changes whilst providing producers and processors with 
enough certainty about the price. The USC designed up to six dairy cow milk 
indexes and they are permanently updated and freely accessible to the 
industry through the INLAC website (INLAC, 2019).  
 
3.106 Even though competition law prevents INLAC from recommending that 
this should be the preferred option to apply, its support and following up of its 
implementation seems to suggest that it is the preferable option to them. This 
agreed price or price mechanism cannot be modified unilaterally during the 
length of the contract (no purchaser discretion). Only if both parts agreed to 




contract and then to establish the new price or price mechanism in a new 




3.107 Given the commercial sensitivity of contracts’ content, INLAC has been 
entrusted with supervisory duties over the matter. Thereby, all the contracts 
signed between producers and first purchasers of raw milk must be sent to 
INLAC, remaining in custody for at least two years. This access to the 
contracts enables INLAC to act as a mediator in case of disputes arisen from 
misinterpretation or breach of contract terms. If an agreement could not be 
achieved through this amicable procedure, the parts must determine in the 
contract if they prefer to refer the dispute to either the ordinary court system, 
or the Spanish Arbitration Court. In this last case the dispute will be solved in 




3.108 Each producer may subscribe as many contracts with as many 
purchasers of milk, as long as he/she only has a single contract with each of 
them to regulate their commercial relationships. 
 
Market transparency – information disclosure 
 
3.109 First purchasers of raw milk are enforced by law to monthly feed an 
electronic database with the milk volume that they have received from each 
producer. The total amount paid to each producer, including premiums and 
penalisations must also be declared.  
 
3.110 A weighted average price is obtained by dividing the total amount paid 
between the litres delivered and published every month by Spanish region. 
This database is freely accessible (Gobierno de España, 2019). 
 
Views about the contracts in Spain 
 
3.111 As regards the functioning of contracts (Santiso, et al., 2018) provided 
the following opinions from stakeholders:  
 
3.112 From the processors’ perspective - There exists an imbalance 
between a 12-month contract between producers and processors and shorter 
contracts that currently occur between processor and retailers, similar to the 
situation in the UK. The processors have stated that they face difficulty in 
setting long term prices within contracts without compromissing the flexibility 
required to remain competitive in the market. As a result, prices offered over a 
12-month term are often viewed to be too low, and farmers prefer shorter term 





3.113 As regards the indexation price mechanisms, processors fear that 
benchmarking the price of raw milk will remove competitiveness to their final 
product, in particular for products aimed to export markets. They feel it would 
be useful to have informaton on  the implications of using such indexation 
tools, and indexes would need to be  updated periodically to adjust for 
changing market dynamics. 
 
3.114 From the perspective of the producer - Producers consider that the 
bargaining power imbalance between themselves and processors prevents 
effective negotiation. The buyer imposes the conditions on the contract, 
including the price and index.  
 
3.115 Producers disagree with using the FEGA price as benchmarking index, 
because the index is not independent as it is affected by the previously 
established price set by the buyers. Moreover, it is their view that the increase 
of prices received in 2017 was lower to that in the European markets due to 




3.116 Santiso and Sineiro (2016), who were involved in designing the Spanish 
price indexes, consider that the entire process of the CMO implementation in 
Spain has been affected by two factors namely: (1) the diffused distribution of 
the devolved powers between the central and the regional governments and 
(2) the pressure exerted by anti-trust governing bodies against the introduction 
of indexation tools. They concluded that the actions of the Spanish Comisión 
Nacional de la Competencia (CNC)3,  regarding the implementation of the Milk 
Package may have been partially biased in favour of the retail sector due to 
their proximity to the final consumer. As a result, some initiatives aimed at 
improving the relationships in the raw milk supply chain were opposed by the 
CNC, and even some sanctions have been imposed to dairy processing 
industries for anticompetitive behaviour (price collusion) (Santiso and Sineiro, 
2015).  
 
3.117 Santiso and Sineiro also concluded that the imposition of mandatory 
contracts has not been followed by an actual process of negotiation between 
the involved parts (i.e., producers and processors), and has become a mere 
bureaucratic burden where normally the processor imposes the content to the 
producer in a take it or leave it offer. 
 
3.118 The price volatility during 2014 and 2015 encouraged farmers to refuse 
in great numbers the established minimum contract duration of 12 months. 
                                         
3 i.e., the public organism commissioned with defending the competitiveness within the 




According to the most recent data available only 4.3% of total raw milk 
deliveries in Spain were under a contract with a duration of 12 months or more 
by September 2018 (Gobierno de España, 2018). Despite the provided 
indexation tools, the majority of the farmers opted for fixing the price and 
reducing the duration of the contract. The elimination of the European dairy 
quotas in 2015 added pressure to the situation, resulting in an increase in milk 
production that was destined mainly to the spot market. In this environment, 
the renovation of a great deal of contracts coincided with an oversupplied 
market (Santiso and Sineiro, 2016a).  
 
3.119 In spite of the usefulness of the indexation mechanisms to 
counterbalance price volatility, these still remain underused throughout the 
sector. By September 2018, 63.2% of milk deliveries were under a fixed price 
contract, 22.3% under a variable price contract, and 14.5% under a mixed 
price one (Gobierno de España, 2018). The USC as part of their mandate to 
follow up and improve the implementation of the indexation tools has surveyed 
the sector as to understand why this is resistant to use the indexes.  
 
3.120 Diagram 7 presents a summary of the structure of the dairy contracts in 
Spain.  
 




Relationship between processors 
and retailers are based short term 
contracts.
FARMERS
1-1 relationship with milk buyer. 
Relationship governed by 
contracts of minimum a year. 
The contracts include all the 
elements but the most important 
is the price paid.
PROCESSORS
Processors negotiate with several producers' 
organisations. In terms of quantities, they allowed a 
deviation of 5% with respect to the agreed volumes. 
A fixed price, a price mechanism 
(variable price), or a mixed one 
(part fixed and part variable). 
This agreed price cannot be 
modified unilaterally during the 
length of the contract (no 
purchaser discretion). 
Cooperatives are not obliged to 


























4. Introduction of mandatory contracts 
and farm price volatility4 
 
 
4.1 The purpose of this section is to investigate the impact that the 
implementation of MWCs under the EU agricultural Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) regulation had on raw milk price volatility among twelve 
member states. Table 3 presents the countries implementing the contracts. 
 
4.2 It is important to emphasise that although volatility is frequently 
mentioned on the discussions of MWCs (e.g., Scottish Government ITT), the 
purpose of those contracts it is not to reduce volatility but to provide 
transparency on the relationships between milk producers and their 
customers.  
 
4.3 Volatility is a directionless measure of the variability of a price over time 
(Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). Price movements are embedded in the market’s 
clearing mechanism that enables demand and supply of any product to match. 
Price changes may reflect improvements in competitive advantages along the 
supply chain, as they may also disclose changing preferences on consumers 
that allow for efficient relocation of resources (O'Connor and Keane, 2011). In 
addition, unexpected large price variations may occur attending to other 
                                         
4 This section presents a summary of the study. For details, see section 7.3.  
Key points 
• This analysis investigated the impact of the implementation of 
mandatory written contracts (MWC) under the EU agricultural Common 
Market Organisation (CMO) regulation in raw milk price volatility in 
twelve member states using time series models.  
• The results showed evidence that in three of these members states 
(France, Hungary, and Slovakia) milk price volatility decreased after the 
internal implementation of MWCs.  
• In the rest of the countries under consideration the results found were 
varied, with raw milk prices’ variance either found to be constant or to 
vary in a non-significant manner over the period studied. This could be 
due to a variety of causes such as that written contracts were commonly 
used before the 2012 Milk Package.  
• It should be highlighted that the CMO regulation included not only 
prescriptions about the introduction of MWC but also other 
recommendations in order to improve the position of dairy farmers in the 
supply chain (e.g., implementation of dairy farmers’ PO and IBOs), as to 
improve producers bargaining position and transparency within the dairy 




multiple factors, accordingly markets that behave in that manner are described 
as volatile (FAO and OECD, 2011).  
 
Table 3: MWCs implementation in Europe 
 
 
4.4 Impacts caused by excessive market volatility may be varied. Some 
examples could be among others: inefficient investment induced by risk 
averse behaviour, non-optimal production decision-making, or food security 
issues (FAO and OECD, 2011; Piot-Lepetit and M'Bareck, 2011).  
 
4.5 Most agricultural markets possess characteristics that may stimulate 
volatility. It is common that agricultural markets exhibit price-inelastic demand 
and supply where the quantities supplied and demanded vary less than price 
in proportion. On the other hand, agricultural output may be dependent on 
weather conditions. As a result of both circumstances small variations in 
production may prompt huge variations in price (Piot-Lepetit and M'Bareck, 
2011). 
 
4.6 The data consisted of historical time-series of monthly averages prices 
of raw cow’s milk at real fat content paid to milk producers expressed in euros 
per 100 kilograms. The data were obtained from the European Commission’s 
Milk Market Observatory on October 2018 for all those EU members that had 
implemented in their internal regulation the utilisation of MWCs for the 
marketing of raw milk (European Commission, 2018). The period covered in 
this study extends from January 2003 to August 2018, except for Bulgaria and 
Romania, whose series start at January 2007 and 2009 respectively due to 
data availability. Croatia has not been included in this analysis because there 
are no available data previous to the implementation of MWCs in June 2013.  
 
Member State Implementation Minimum Duration (C)ontracts / (O)ffers Compulsory
France Apr-11 5 years C + O
Italy Mar-12 1 year C + O
Spain Oct-12 1 year C + O
Lithuania Oct-12 - C
Hungary Dec-12 6 months C
Slovakia Dec-12 - C
Croatia Jun-13 6 months C
Cyprus Jun-13 1 year C
Portugal Jun-13 6 months C + O
Bulgaria Nov-13 6 months C
Romania Feb-14 6 months C + O
Slovenia Jan-15 1 year C
Poland Oct-15 - C




4.7 The analysis of price volatility deals with the measurement of its 
variation over time. Hence, volatility analysis must focus on the variance of the 
probability distribution of the prices (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). As it is 
customary in this type of analysis the log returns of monthly average prices of 
raw milk were used to assess how the implementation of MWCs has affected 
prices’ volatility. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the series under 
observation. It may be observed that all of the series exhibit the excess 
kurtosis5, with all values larger than 3, that is a sign of volatility (O'Connor and 
Keane, 2011). 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
4.8 In terms of methods, the analysis used the Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model, which is a statistical time 
series method that allows modelling both the mean of a variable (in this case 
the raw milk price) and its variance. Since their development, GARCH models 
have been extensively used to analyse agricultural commodity markets 
volatility (Piot-Lepetit and M'Bareck, 2011; O'Connor and Keane, 2011; Gilbert 
and Morgan, 2010; Yang, et al., 2001).  
 
4.9 This analysis extends the use of the GARCH model to test the 
hypothesis that raw milk price volatility changed in selected European dairy 
markets associated to the introduction of MWCs as part of the implementation 
of the EU-CMO regulation. The GARCH model allows doing so because it not 
just may properly describe the time-varying pattern of price variability, but in 
addition the model enables the inclusion of explanatory variables in the 
specification of the conditional variance. 
 
4.10 Thereby, following Enders (2015) a dummy variable equal to 0 before 
the introduction of the MWCs and equal to 1 after the introduction, was 
                                         
5 Kurtosis is a measure related to the tails of a distribution, higher kurtosis is the result of 
infrequent extreme deviations (or outliers), and as opposed to frequent modestly sized 
deviations. 
Member State Observed period Obs. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Bulgaria 01/2007 - 08/2018 139 0.001979 0.1376 -0.1208 0.0362 0.3130 5.2293
Cyprus 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.002369 0.1279 -0.0489 0.0201 2.2720 14.2811
France 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.000457 0.1338 -0.2713 0.0472 -0.8059 8.4099
Hungary 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 -0.000172 0.2120 -0.1887 0.0444 0.2456 8.6420
Italy 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 -0.000085 0.0841 -0.0850 0.0208 0.1951 8.5564
Lithuania 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.002755 0.2183 -0.2921 0.0652 0.3023 6.2023
Poland 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.002962 0.1721 -0.0936 0.0349 0.4374 5.3478
Portugal 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 -0.000622 0.1442 -0.1308 0.0332 -0.3481 7.5433
Romania 01/2009 - 08/2018 115 0.001768 0.1221 -0.1277 0.0454 0.0870 3.2057
Slovakia 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.001589 0.1208 -0.1333 0.0333 -0.4040 7.3138
Slovenia 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.000002 0.0992 -0.0829 0.0250 -0.2432 5.3344
Spain 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.000286 0.1154 -0.0598 0.0226 0.9063 7.9236
Note: Data are expressed as li returns (Price t /Price t-1) of the average monthly prices of raw milk obtained as




created and added to the model of each country under consideration. The 
statistical significance of the dummy will indicate whether the introduction of 
MWCs has affected or not raw milk price volatility, with its positive or negative 
sign indicating the direction of the change (Yang, et al., 2001). Note that this 
assumes that the effects over the price volatility start from that point onwards, 
however such effect may take time to materialise and produce the expected 
effects. 
 
4.11 According to the model selection strategy, a preliminary step consists of 
checking the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity on the residuals of the 
modelled series. The tests for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and 
Romania’s time-series did not find ARCH effects on the series. In other words, 
the variance of the log-return of the prices in these series remained constant. 
In other terms, these countries did not show any effect that the introduction of 
the MWCs changed the volatility of raw milk prices. 
 
4.12 The rest of the time-series in which conditional heteroscedasticity 
effects on the residuals were detected (i.e., France, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain) were subsequently modelled as GARCH 
processes. The results are presented in Table 5. The sign of the parameter (δ) 
for each country indicates whether the introduction of the contracts have 
brought a reduction on the variance of the milk prices of the country. Note that 
although this was observed in five of the six cases, only three cases were 
statistically significant.  
 
Table 5: Conditional variance equation estimates 
 
  
4.13 Therefore, the results indicate that at least in three of the countries 
where MWC have been implemented (i.e., France, Hungary, and Slovakia) 
raw milk price volatility has decreased after their introduction.  
Coefficient Member State
France Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Spain
𝛚 0.0018 0.0016 0.0015 0.0004 0.0003 0.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0420
𝛂 0.2000 0.3500 0.3200 0.5000 0.3300 0.1400
p-value 0.0083 0.0005 0.0036 0.0001 0.0062 0.0209
𝛃 - - - - - 0.7600
p-value - - - - - 0.0000
𝛂 + 𝛃 0.2000 0.3500 0.3200 0.5000 0.3300 0.9000
𝛅 -9.4000 -13.1800 -1.2400 -2.7200 1.0800 -0.1100
p-value 0.0052 0.0000 0.7278 0.0000 0.1722 0.1402
Note:
  𝛚 , 𝛂 ,  𝛃 , and  𝛅  , are parameters:
  𝛚 is the intercept;  𝛂 accounts for the squared residuals of the error term; and 𝛃  accounts for  the lagged values of
  the conditional variance. 𝛂 + 𝛃 signals the persistence of the volatility. The closer to 1 the greatest the persistence.
  𝛅 reflects the impact of the dummy variable and expresses the MWC elasticity of price returns.







5.1 This discussion covers two topics: (1) a comparison between the 
Scottish dairy sector with those of countries where MWCs are in operation and 
(2) an examination and assessment of how MWCs could be applied in 





• The aim of the CMO rules was to improve stability in the EU dairy sector 
by promoting better contractual relationships and addressing the 
imbalance of bargaining power between farmers and first purchasers. 
• Whilst there are points in common in the dairy sector of each country 
such as the fact in all the countries retailers are the stakeholders with 
significant negotiation power; there are substantial differences between 
all of them. This speaks about the adaptability of the CMO rules behind 
MWCs to the different business environments. 
• None of the studied cases pointed out that MWCs brought problems for 
their dairy sectors. In at least one case (i.e., France) processors were 
grateful that the exclusivity clause had been eliminated. 
• Establishing MWCs may bring an initial cost for the industry to adapt 
their current contracts and practices but it may increase the 
transparency and certainty for dairy farmers. 
• It is important to consider the structure of the MWCs together (e.g., 
volumes, pricing and contract length) instead of analysing each clause 
and keeping the other aspects unmodified.  
• Under the current market structure characterised by processors that are 
highly vulnerable (due to their products portfolio) and changes in their 
costs of production, it is not feasible to introduce pricing mechanisms to 
the contracts and minimum duration without removing the current 
exclusivity clause from the contracts. 
• The elimination of the exclusivity clause worries some processors that it 
will create them problems to ensure a reliable supply of milk. The 
observed experiences indicate that processor operate without any 
problem by asking farmers to state in the contract their expected 
quarterly or monthly milk supply for the contract period (e.g., a year), 
also including clauses that allow for deviations from those values and 
penalties in case of very significant deviations. 
• The introduction of POs can be good way not only to improve the 
bargaining power of farmers but also to organise the milk supply for 
processors.   
5.1 Scottish dairy sector and countries that implemented 
MWCs 
5.2 Table 6 provides a comparison of the structure of the dairy sector in 
Scotland with those of countries that have implemented MWCs. The purpose 
of the Table is not to present an exhaustive description of each country’s 
sector but to highlight major charateristics. 
5.3 Whilst there are points in common in the dairy sector of each country 
such as the fact in all the countries retailers are the stakeholders with 
substantive negotiation power; there are substantial differences between all of 
them. This speaks about the flexibility of the CMO rules behind MWCs to 
adapt to the different business environments. 
5.4 Whilst France and Italy and to a less extent Hungary, are characterised 
by strong processing sectors with branded products that highlight the quality 
of the product, in Scotland the quality of the products is taken as given (as a 
standard) and not a source of differentiation (therefore, they do not command 
a premium). The effect of this is that processors have less negotiation 
capacity with retailers.  
5.5 The above effect is reinforced by the fact that processors sell private 
label products to retailers. This allows processors to reduce their average 
costs by expanding their production, which reduces their average 
overheads/fixed costs (i.e., as mentioned in DairyUK contribution 
“[p]rocessors require a continuous flow of product, to maximise utilisation of 
processing plant”). However, although one should expect that retailers take 
the lion’s share of the increasing in profits brought by the expansion on the 
production (and therefore, low marketing margins by processors), there is no 
information about the negotiations between retailers and processors. 
5.6 In categories such as drinking milk and cheese (particularly Cheddar), 
processors operate in an environment of intense competitive pressure and 
uncertainty over market returns (DairyUK), which can be exemplified by the 
importance of private labels on the drinking milk and Cheddar categories. 
Figures 16 and 17 presents the evolution of the provate label shares on both 
categories from 2006 to 2017 in Scotland by major retailer. 
5.7 As shown in both Figures 16 and 17,the presence of private labels is 
significant, particularly on drinking milk. Their presence increases the 





Table 6: Comparison of dairy sector features in the studied countries 














change under  
‘purchaser 
discretion’. 
Price based on 
commodities 
price. 
Several PO sell 
to a processor. 
5 year contracts 
and follow the 
CMO rules with 























milk is to 
PDO 
cheeses. 





are 1 year 
and follow 
CMO rules. 
Law does not 
set a minimum 
length contract 
and the 
conditions  are 
left to 
negotiation 























length is a 
year. All 
sales of milk 
must be 
covered by a 
contract. 
The price can 
be either 
fixed, variable 












































































Organisations Only 1 
producer coop 
(MSA) 





but not POs) 





48 POs and 
no IBO. 















8 POs (cow’s 










Notes: 1/ Percentage of milk collection in the most recent year with 
information (i.e., 2016 or 2017). 
 
5.8 It is important to note that the described situation may explain low 
marketing margins6 but not necessarily farmgate price volatility, except in the 
case when processors are in need to exercise their ‘purchaser discretion’ on 
prices paid due, for instance, to a  sudden change in their relationship with 
retailers.7   
                                         
6 This is expressed in the following quotation from The Grocer “What we do know, one 
industry source points out, is that supermarket supply deals have historically been weighted 
towards high volume and low margins so as to sustain low shelf prices. They are also used 
to “cross-subsidise” more expensive systems, such as retailer-aligned milk pools, and this 
has contributed to a commoditisation of the sector” (White, 14-12-2018). 




Figure 16: Scotland - Private label share on total sales of drinking milk 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
 
Figure 17: Scotland - Private label share on total sales of Cheddar cheese 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Kantar Worldpanel data. 
 
5.9 It has long been accepted that the main source of farmgate price 
volatility is their condition as commodity (i.e., the same milk can be used for 
different purposes and it is paid according to the wholesale commodity prices 
e.g., skimmed milk powder, butter or mild cheddar) (Milk Development 
Council, 2006; DairyUK contribution). This implies that farmgate prices are 
                                         
retailers for its branded butter just months after it hit shelves. The processor introduced four 
Müller Spreadable products into Tesco, alongside a 250g unsalted Müller block (i.e., branded 
products) in May 2018. It was expected them to “disrupt the category” by focusing on taste 
and leveraging the brand power of Müller. However, Tesco ditched the entire range in 
November, while Waitrose stopped selling Müller Spreadable last month (i.e., December). A 
Müller spokesman said: “While Müller Spreadable is not listed in Tesco or Waitrose, we will 


























































































exposed to the vagaries of both international markets and domestic supluses 
or deficits of milk.  
 
5.10 In the above context, low marketing margins together with fluctuating 
farmgate milk prices and the exclusivity clause, where the processor has to 
purchase all the milk that is offered by farmers, imply high business risks for 
both producers and processors. Based on the above description of the 
Scottish sector the next step is to analyse how MWCs can be applied to 
Scotland and their effects on the sector.   
 
5.2 How MWCs can be applied in Scotland and their likely 
impact 
 
5.11 As mentioned farmers and processors operating in Scotland already 
market of milk through contracts. Therefore, this section will concentrate on 
those elements in the CMO that are not found in the Scottish contracts (i.e., as 
describe in the DairyUK contribution) and based on the lessons gathered in 
the six studied European cases. 
 
5.12 It is important to note from the start that the aim of the CMO was to 
improve stability in the EU dairy sector by promoting better contractual 
relationships and addressing the imbalance of bargaining power between 
farmers and first purchasers. This was also stated in the ‘Groceries Code 
Adjudicator Review: Part 2’  according to which, “[t]he Government plans to 
introduce compulsory written contracts in the dairy sector in 2018. This has a 
potentially valuable role to play in providing extra transparency and certainty 
for dairy farmers […]. Formal consultation will be undertaken on the necessary 
secondary legislation. Our aim is to launch the public consultation by March 
2018” (HM Government, 2018). 
 
1. Compulsory formal written contracts  
 
5.13 One of the main concerns raised in the GCA consultation (HM 
Government, 2018) was a significant pattern of unfair or unclear terms and 
conditions in contracts between producers and the processors, 
slaughterhouses, or manufacturers that they supply. These concerns were 
particularly prominent in the dairy sector.  
 
5.14 Establishing a mandatory contract content as in the CMO should  bring 
an initial cost for the industry to adapt their current contracts and practices (an 
evaluation of the cost can be found in Defra, 2013) but it may increase the 





5.15 Some countries (e.g., Spain) yearly publish a contract model (without 
mandatory application) that may be used by the industry as a blueprint 
contract. This allows farmers’ organisations to provide general advice to milk 
producers, usually the part less informed in the contractual negotiation, as to 
contract interpretation. 
 
5.16 In addition, the contract may contain mediation clauses that are similar 
across cases.  
 
2. The written offer: ‘evergreen’ contracts  
 
5.17 The GCA consultation also raised the difficulties that producers face in 
trying to terminate their contracts within a reasonable period if significant 
changes to prices or the terms of contracts are proposed. These can have 
major commercial implications for a small producer (HM Government, 2018). 
 
5.18 In fact, it is common practice within the UK dairy sector the use of rolling 
or ‘evergreen’ contracts. These contracts renew automatically after each 
period under the same contract conditions. This, in addition to the use of long 
notice periods to terminate the contract may perpetuate a non-negotiated 
contractual relationship.  
 
5.19 Some countries have tried to improve this situation by imposing milk 
buyers the obligation to make a mandatory written offer in advance. This 
formal offer is sent to the producer two months in advance of the contract 
termination date comprising the conditions of the contract for the following 
period. 
 
3. Price determination, its changes and exclusivity clauses 
 
5.20 A number of respondents to the GCA consultation highlighted the 
challenge posed by variations to specifications or contract terms, especially if 
imposed at short notice (HM Government, 2018). 
 
5.21 As explained in the DairyUK contribution, processors are exposed to 
commercial pressures (e.g., low margins at the retail market, variable 
farmgate prices and  quantity variability as result of production seasonality 
combined with the exclusivity clauses), therefore, pricing clauses in contracts 
between dairy processors and their supplying farmers have historically been 
built around flexibility reflected on the purchaser discretion to vary the farm 
gate price as and when they see fit. 
 
5.22 Processors have argued that purchaser discretion is a natural 
consequence in order to balance the commercial risk that they are assuming 




exclusivity clauses.8 This circumstance connects price negotiation with the 
issue of milk volume management. 
 
5.23 Most of the existing applications of MWCs on the European dairy 
markets follow the CMO regulation recommending that the price should be 
freely negotiated and agreed by the parts and included in the contract, either 
in a fixed or variable form for the duration of the contract. Clearly under the 
current conditions (i.e., processors buying all the milk produced by their 
farmers) this pricing system, would mean exposing them to a significant 
business risk.  
 
5.24 Under the current market structure, characterised by highly vulnerable 
processors due to their products' portfolio and changes in their costs of 
production, it is not feasible to introduce pricing mechanisms and minimum 
contract duration without taking into consideration delivery volumes.  
 
5.25 An example of the above could be the case of a contract between a 
processor and farmers, where the conditions are a contract length of year (i.e., 
the conditions of the contract cannot change during that period), the price paid 
to farmers depends on the international price of skimmed milk powder (SMP) 
through a formula, and the farmers deliver all the milk they produce to the 
processor (i.e., under exclusivity). If the price of SMP increases dramatically, it 
will encourage farmers to produce more and the processor will face a 
substantial increase on the total costs of milk and will need to dispose the 
excess of milk without necessarily having a market for it.  
 
5.26 There are at least two ways to reduce the processor's vulnerability in 
the above example: one way would be to consider a contract where the 
exclusivity clause is eliminated and replaced by an agreed in advance 
schedule of milk delivery (i.e., agreed volumes). The second way, would be to 
maintain the exclusivity clause but replace the price formula by a type "A&B" 
pricing, where the processor would pay price A for an agreed volume of milk 
and much lower price for any milk delivered in excess of the agreed volume. 
The low price should discourage farmers to produce in excess. 
 
5.27 Eliminating exclusivity clauses would liberate processors from the 
burden of seasonal surplus of milk eliminating significantly the quantity risk. 
However, at the same time it would require setting volumes on the contracts 
leaving the responsibility for managing the marketing of any potential 
                                         
8 This can be seen in the following news from The Grocer “Müller Milk & Ingredients 
announced today it would cut the price it paid to members of the Müller Milk Group (on 
Müller Direct non supermarket-aligned contracts) to 26.25p per litre from 1 March, which is a 
1.25p drop on its January price and a 2.25p drop on the price it paid in December. The 
processor said the price cut reflected “a surge in milk production from farms”, with AHDB 
data suggesting off-farm milk production in December was the highest for a quarter of a 




production surplus on the producers (or their organisations). This is the case 
in all the studied countries. 
 
5.28 Another potential advantage of eliminating exclusivity on contracts is the 
possibility of farmers to decide what to do with the milk surplus once they have 
honoured their contracts. Farmers may decide to sell it to the processor if both 
parties agree, sell it to a different processor or decide to process it 
themselves. 
 
5.29 A concern expressed regarding the elimination of exclusivity is that it 
may affect the stable supply of milk to processors. In all the studied countries, 
quantities supplied and variations are established into the contracts without 
bringing any problem. For instance, in France, cooperatives accept all the milk 
from their associated farmers whilst private processors set quantities as part 
of their contracts, having the possibility to buy additional quantities from their 
farmers at their discression. A problem that might occur is the potential 
existence of moral hazard issues in which a farmer reports not being able to 
honour its contract with a processor and instead market the milk to another 
one due to a better price. This could be avoided by reporting all the sales of 
milk a competent authority, for instance, to an IBO. This could also be avoided 
by the presence of PO organising the supply of milk. 
 
5.30 Note that the effectiveness of the A&B pricing depends on the reaction 
of the supply to the set prices. If the B price is set too high, low cost producers 
may still over deliver. 
 
5.31 As regards the pricing of milk, one of the aspects of concern is the lack 
of indicators that are suitable to establish formulas or set fix prices. However, 
current practices use price indicators available in the market (e.g., wholesale 
prices) moderated with other factors such as the companies’ economic results 
as well as quality and seasonal factors. As mentioned, the CMO proposal is 
very flexible as it allows the Member States to introduce the specific legislation 
and companies to adapt their pricing to their specific situation and products. 
The diversity of business environments where the CMO has been applied and 
how it has been adapted by the Member States reflects its flexibility. 
 
5.32 It is important at this point to ask the question whether this pricing would 
imply higher or less volatile prices to farmers. Under the CMO rules prices are 
negotiated between processors and farmers and most probably the price 
formulas will be based on the same commodity prices that currently determine 
the prices of milk in Scotland.  Therefore, one should not expect higher prices 
or less volatile prices due to the introduction of MWCs. However, what MWCs 
would avoid is the the sudden changes in conditions coming, say, from 
changes originated from processors’ customers (e.g., retailers). The 
discussion points out that there is not a lack of market price indicators to base 




the introduction of MWCs is the elimination of purchasers’ discretion right to 
change prices when they see fit. 
 
4. Producers’ organisations and interbranch organisations 
 
5.33 As noted by HM Government (2018) compared with other, more 
powerful players in the groceries supply chain, primary producers are much 
smaller and disaggregated. The lack of bargaining power of many farmers and 
growers was an important theme raised by those responding to the Call for 
Evidence (i.e., GCA consultation). 
 
5.34 Producers’ organisations have been useful devices in some of the 
European countries under study to solve both issues: strengthening producers 
bargaining position in the negotiation of contracts and milk volume 
management. POs depend on farmers’ initiative and cannot be imposed, say 
by the Governments. However, the Government can initially foster them as 
they need to led by a professional team that need to gain the trust of farmers. 
As in the studied countries POs need to be funded by farmers. 
 
5.35 It is clear that although international conditions matter for the industry; 
as explained before, the particular structure of the dairy supply chain is also 
important. Interbranch organisations are structures that are useful for 
stakeholders (where all the parties are represented) to discuss issues 


























6. Conclusions and recommendations 
6.1 The purpose of this report has been to present the results of an analysis 
of the compulsory contracts or mandatory written contracts in European 
countries as there is currently limited evidence on the impact of these in the 
countries in which they currently operate.  
 
6.2 In general the study does not find reasons why the MWCs cannot be 
applied to the Scottish dairy market. However, the specific conditions need to 
be negotiated between the parties. 
 
Recommendations for the Industry 
 
6.3 To avoid excessive exposure of processors to risk and damages to the 
dairy supply chain, it is important that the exclusivity clauses should be 
eliminated and replaced by contracts that stipulate volume, price and 
minimum contract time duration. 
 
6.4 Given the seasonality of the production annual contracts are probably 
the most suitable duration of the contracts (evergreen contracts can be 
negotiated by the parties).  
 
6.5 Farmers commit on contracts a schedule of quarterly or monthly 
volumes, with deviations negotiated. 
 
6.6 Mandatory written offers in advance (i.e., a formal offer is sent to the 
producer say two months in advance of the contract termination date) 
comprising the conditions of the contract for the following period can be useful 
to avoid the difficulties that producers face in trying to terminate their contracts 
within a reasonable period if significant changes to prices or the terms of 
contracts are proposed. 
 
6.7 The pricing scheme chosen (i.e., fixed, formula or a combination of 
both) is also subject to negotiation and might depend on the duration of the 
contracts.  
 
6.8 The industry can benefit of encouraging POs. For farmers, they can 
provide bargaining or at least greater help with understanding the details 
behind the contracts. For processors they can provide an organised way to 
collect milk reducing transaction costs. 
 
6.9 In addition, establishing an IBO, bringing together all the stakeholders, 
would be useful for the industry as it will allow them to discuss supply chain 





Recommendations for the Scottish Government 
 
6.10 Encourage the formation of POs led by negotiators with skills and 
experience and are able to gain the trust of farmers. A strategy for this needs 
to be established with problably the Government supporting financially the 
starting of the POs, although they should be supported by the farmers. 
 
6.11 Encourage the industry to create an IBO, with the participation of all the 
stakeholders i.e., farmers, processors and retailers, to discuss dairy supply 











7.1 France’s production accounts 25 billion tonnes, which is equivalent to 
15.8% of EU milk deliveries (based on 2017 volumes). Its exports of dairy 
products, converted into milk equivalent represent the 41.6% of the milk 
deliveries, and 13.0% of EU dairy exports in milk equivalent (year 2017) 
(CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics for the dairy sector in France is 
presented in Table A.1 in the Annex, section 7.2. 
 
7.2 France is the seventh biggest world producer of milk after the United 
States, India, China, Brasil, Russian and Germany and the second in Europe 
(FranceAgriMer 2018a). The French dairy productios is distributed among 
twelve regions or departments (S.S.P. Enquête Annuelle Laitière – 2017). 
However, 55% of farms and milk production are concentrated in the North-
West of France in three regions namely: Bretagne, Pays-de-la-Loire and 
Normandie. The Bretagne department is the most important, accounting for 
almost 27% of the farms and 20% of milk production. Pays-de-la-Loire and 
Normandie covers respectively  16% of the French milk production and hosts 
14% of farms. 
 
7.3 Three main production areas can be distinguished in France (Dervillé 
and Allaire, 2014): specialised plain areas generally located in the north-
western part of France, mixed farming areas with light milk density, and 
mountainous areas. As stated by  Trouvé et al. (2016),  the French farm 
structure and its spatial distribution was highly influenced by the 
implementation of quotas.  The abolition of quotas in 2015 caused a change in 
its dynamics of growth with the west, north and east plain areas seeing 
growth. Mountain farms experienced declining profitability while there was an 
abandonment of farmland in the intermediary areas.  
 
7.4 The Dairy production sector in France has gone through a dramatic 
structural change during the period 2007-2017, which was characterised by a 
reduction of 63 thousand dairy farms and around 100 thousand cows (CNIEL, 




7.5 At a dairy processing level, the percentages of milk used for domestic 
liquid consumption and manufacture are: 40% of the milk is processed into 




Origin (PDO)), 27% into butter and cream, 13% into milk powder, 10% into 
milk, 7% into fresh products (yogurts or deserts) and 3% is directed to other 
uses. In addition, approximately 25% of the processed products are sold to 
industries for further processing whilst the 75% are sold to the general public 
(FranceAgriMer 2018a).  
 
7.6 There are more than 730 dairy processors in France9 (CNIEL, 2018) 
with a turnover of 19,711 million euros (CNIEL, 2018).  
 
7.7 624 processors reported manufacturing cow milk to a monthly dairy 
survey during 2017 (FranceAgriMer, 2018b). Of these, cooperatives groups 
represent 50.4% of all the processors and the remaining 49.6% are private 
operators. The majority of these establishments (58.7%) are specialised on 
only one dairy category such as packaged milk, fats, packaged cream, ultra-
fresh products - yogurts and dessert, cheeses or milk powders. Cheese 
processors are the most significant most significant group (70.5% of the 
processors) followed by ultra-fresh products (14.5%) and milk powder (8.2%) 
(FranceAgriMer, 2018b).  
 
7.8 There are different size of coperatives: 10 very large ones with a 
turnover in excess of 300 million euros, 30 medium size cooperatives and 200 
fruitières with a turnover much lower (Trouvé et al., 2016). As of 2011, Sodiaal 
is the largest French cooperative group, ranking 17th in the world, 4.9 billion 
litres collected. Other large purchasers areLaïta, Agrial and Eurial collecting 
together around a billion litres of milk.  
 
7.9 Among the large private companies, four are in the top 25 world 
turnover ranking: Lactalis (No. 1, with 16 billion Euros in turnover), Danone 
(No. 4), Bongrain/Savencia (No. 18) and Bel (No. 24) (CNIEL, 2018).  The 
distribution of manufactured products among the different dairy products areas 
does not vary between cooperatives and private groups (FranceAgriMer, 
2018b).  
 
7.10 French dairy processors are concentrated in six regions: 72% of the 
production is located in four regions, being Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes the most 
important one as concerning the number of manufacturing sites. However, 
when considering the volume of milk processed Hauts-de-France is the 
leading region covering 25% of the produced volume followed by Bretagne 
and Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes with 17.5% and  15.6% respectively 
(FranceAgriMer, 2018b).  The degree of concentration per dairy products area 
changes by products; nevertheless the top processors are: Lactalis, Danone, 
Savencia, Sodiaal (FranceAgriMer, 2018b). 
 
 
                                         






7.11 In 2017 Hungary, which a production of 1.9 billion tonnes of milk, 
accounted for 1.0%  of EU milk deliveries. Its exports of dairy products 
converted into milk equivalent  were 40.4% of the milk deliveries and 0.8% of 
EU dairy exports (CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics for the dairy sector in 
Hungary is presented in Table A.2 in the Annex, section 7.2.  
 
7.12 The Hungarian dairy sector underwent significant structural 
transformation during the last two decades because of two key political 
factors: (1) the fall of the socialist system in 1989 and (2) its accession to the 
European Union (EU) in 2004 (Perekhozhuk, et al., 2011).  
 
7.13 One of the results of the liberalisation of the economy was the reduction 
in the number of dairy farms (Bakucs, et al., 2013). Between 2000 and 2016, 
the number of dairy cows decreased by 31.2% from 355 to 244 thousand 
heads. Raw milk production fell by only 8% however as milk yieldsgrew 
steadily during the period. By 2016, they had risen to 7,862 kg/head from just 
over 6,000kg/head in (European Commission, 2019).  
 
7.14 The abolition of the Hungarian national milk price support system, 
incompatible with EU competition rules, has been pointed out as another 
underpinning factor for this decline in the sector. Until 2004, the Hungarian 
government favoured those dairy processors who paid a targeted minimum 
farm gate price to producers with an export subsidy. This resulted in 
producers getting an artificially high raw milk price in comparison with 
neighbouring countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia  
(Hockmann and Vöneki, 2009). This  situation ended with the elimination of 
the export subsidies. 
 
7.15 One of the main characteristics featured by the Hungarian dairy sector 
since its accession to the EU has been its low competitiveness with respect to 
other EU members. This low competitiveness is due to several factors, which 
Szücs and Szöllösi (2015) have summarised in three main groups: (1) factors 
underpinning the low profitability of milk production settings, with high average 
costs of production; (2) the unfavourable market position of the Hungarian 
processing industry, mainly focused on low value added products with high 
average costs of production facing an internal low demand market for dairy 
products and accompanied by increasing quality regulatory requirements; (3) 
factors that have favoured the introduction of products from other EU 










7.16 Italy accounted for 8.2% of EU milk deliveries in 2017, i.e., 12 billion 
tonnes of milk. The same year its exports of dairy products, converted into 
milk equivalent (ME) represented 32.4% of the milk deliveries and 4.7% of EU 
dairy exports in ME (CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics for the dairy sector 
in Italy is presented in Table A.3 in the Annex, section 7.2.  
 
7.17 Approximately 12 millions of tonnes of milk are produced in Italy (2017) 
and about 13 millions of tonnes of milk are converted in a million tonnes of 
cheese (more than 440 thousand tonnes are Protected Designation of Origin 
(PDO) cheeses - 37 Italian cheese carry a PDO label), almost three millions of 
tonnes of pasteurised drinking milk and 190 thousand tonnes of yogurts and 
fermented milks. The difference between the domestic milk production and the 
utilisation is explained by imports from mainly France and Germany. 
 
7.18 The Italian production of cow’s milk is essentially concentrated in 8 
regions: Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Veneto, Piedmont, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Lazio, Puglia and Friuli Venezia Giulia. In particular, 41% of the total 
production comes from the Lombardy region, while the first 4 regions 
(Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Piedmont) represent about 75% of 




7.19 In total, about 34 thousand processing companies operate in Italy, of 
which about 15 thousand are in the plain areas, 16 thousand in mountain 
areas and 3 thousand in other disadvantaged areas. Production of mountain 
and disadvantaged areas, however, represent only 20% of the total 
production, in contrast with the 80% from the plain areas.  
 
7.20 The distribution of the number of companies by size classes clearly 
shows how about 2/3 of the companies are located in the two smaller size 
classes (with a production of less than 200 tonnes of milk) and accounting for 
less than 15% of total production. Large companies (with a production of over 
1,000 tonnes of milk) instead account for less than 1/5 of the total and 
represent over 70% of total production. 
 
7.21 Although still characterised by a strong productive fragmentation, the 
sector has in the last two decades been subject to a particularly intense 
restructuring phase which led to the drastic reduction in the number of 





7.22 The reduction in the number of companies affected particularly small 
companies and has been more pronounced in the plain area, increasing the 
productivity gap between the plain and mountain areas. Average production 
per company in plain areas increased from 174 to 579 tonnes of milk 
processed in the last two decades whilst in mountain areas it went from 40 to 
113 tonnes. 
 
7.23 At the regional level the structural differences are also marked. Regions 
such as Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto have levels of milk 
production per company higher than the European average (comparable to 
those of France and Germany), while regions such as Puglia and Trentino Alto 
Adige present a lower average company size.  
 
7.24 About 70% of the milk produced in Italy is destined to the production of 
a great variety of traditional cheeses, all of them unique in their organoleptic 
and nutritional characteristics and processing technique: Mozzarella occupies 
the first place as far as volume is concerned – 250,000 tonnes/year – followed 
by the two most popular PDO  cheeses in the world: Grana Padano – the 
most exported with 163,000 tonnes/year and Parmigiano Reggiano – the most 
imitated with 116,000 tons/year. Other cheeses are Gorgonzola, Pecorino, 
Asiago, Taleggio.  
 
7.25 Italy exports almost 250 thousand tonnes of cheese, with a value of 
€1.4 billion. Main Italian exported cheeses are Mozzarella and other fresh 
cheeses (36.4%), Grana Padano PDO and Parmigiano Reggiano PDO (25%) 





7.26 Poland milk production in 2017 was 13.6 billion tonnes, i.e., represents 
7.5% of EU milk deliveries, with its exports of dairy products, converted into 
milk equivalent (ME) being 33.7% of the milk deliveries, and 5.0% of EU dairy 
exports (CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics for the dairy sector in Poland is 
presented in Table A.4 in the Annex, section 7.2.  
 
7.27 In 2013 had Poland around 150 thousand dairy farms with a size of 
more than 10 ha (from a total of 335 thousand farms). Additionally, 
approximately 82% are farmers’ owned. Information to 2015 indicated that 
Poland has 132.5 thousand commercial dairy farms.  
 
7.28 As regards the regional distribution of the production, Podlaskie, in the 
north-east of Poland, is by far the largest region by the number of dairy cows 
(18.3% of the total). It is followed by Wielkopolskie (12% of the total). Both 




market-driven transition in 1989 and accession to the EU in 2004. The 
elimination of the dairy quota system in the EU in 2015 offered new expansion 
opportunities (Sobczyński et al., 2015). 
 
7.29 Poland dairy sector relays significantly on the external market since 
25% of its national production (by volume) is sold outside the country, being 
77% sold in the European Union and 10% in the Central European Initiative. 
Russia was a very important market for its cheeses, and the Russian embargo 
affected significantly Polish exports. It should be noted, however, that since 
2009 the volume of Polish exports has not increased. The increase in value 
has been due to the evolution of international prices, the favourable exchange 
rate, and an increase in exports of products with higher added value, such as 




7.30 In Poland there are approximately 165 dairy processing plants of which 
many are independent companies or small cooperatives. There are 10 large 
processors covering about 60% of domestic production and the rest are of 
relatively small in size (Trouvé et al., 2016). The most important dairy firm in 
the Poland is ranked in 42nd place in terms of turnover at the European Union 
level. In fact, about 75% of the milk processed is in cooperatives and the rest 
is private firms.  
 
7.31 Poland is the 4th European producer of milk but 6th when considering 
dairy processing, with 10 million tonnes of raw milk processed every year in 
Polish territory. Note that part of the Polish milk production is exported to be 
processed in neighbouring countries such as Germany. Nevertheless, Poland 
is the 7th largest cheese producer in the world, and the 5th in the European 
Union.  
 
7.32 According to Trouvé et al. (2016) most the cooperatives have a highly 
politicised management board, strongly linked to the PSL1 (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe, the Polish Peasant Party), a member of the ruling 
coalition, and thus have an important power over the Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
7.33 Since 2015, foreign companies such as Danone, Lactalis, Bongrain and 
Hochland, have been well established in Poland and they transform about 
25% of the milk collection (Trouvé et al., 2016). It should be noted that the 
total number of dairy processing plants is decreasing at a slow rate, while the 
turnover has been increasing rapidly from 2016 to 2017. This indicates a very 
slow concentration of the processing sector. The dairy processing plants 
employ more than 32 thousand people. The number of dairy processing plants 









7.34 The Romanian production of milk in 2017 was 3.8 billion tonnes and 
accounted for 0.7%  of EU milk deliveries in 2017. Its exports of dairy 
products, converted into milk equivalent (ME) represented 22.2% of the milk 
deliveries and 0.3% of EU dairy exports (CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics 
for the dairy sector in Romania is presented in Table A.5 in the Annex, section 
7.2.  
 
7.35 The Romanian dairy production sector is extremely fragmented, small 
sized farms are prevalent on the sector. According to data from the Romania 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development, by April 2009 there 
were around 850 thousand dairy producers, of which 89% held one or two 
cows, amounting for more than 60% of the total dairy livestock (Pieniadz, et 
al., 2009). As to 2017, Romania still had the lowest average number of cows 
per holding (3), the lowest level of milk production per holding (10 tonnes), 
and the lowest annual yield per cow (3.4 tonnes) of the 28 European Union 
members (Wijnands, et al., 2017).   
 
7.36 Measured in terms of economic output, more than 81% of dairy farms 
presented in 2013 a level of EU standard output value below 7,999 euros per 
holding (Grodea, 2016). In addition, Romania presents one of the highest 
levels of employment in agriculture within the European Union. However, this 
vast farm labour force possesses a poor level of training with a high 
percentage of farm holders above 64 years of age (Fredriksson, et al., 2017). 
Such features delineate the traditional structure of a very fragmented and low 
productive sector.  
 
7.37 Although the production settings have begun to change and evolve 
towards fewer and larger production units., and the milk collection method is 
also changing increasingly evolving towards direct deliveries to dairies and 
moving away from the traditional indirect method that used communal 
collecting points. However, there still exist important differences among 




7.38 The above described production sector faces a dairy processing 
industry where big processors (those who employ more than 250 employees) 
generated more than 60% of the total dairy industry turnover in 2013. The 
proportion between these big processors and the number dairy Romanian 
producers was 1 processor per more than 7,000 producers. Meanwhile as to 
2017, there was not any Romanian dairy processing cooperative operating in 




under a contractual agreement to private dairy processors (Wijnands, et al., 
2017).  
 
7.39 Understandably, looking at this fragmentation on production, small size 
of production settings, and lack of cooperative initiatives among producers, 
the latest European Commission report on the operation of the Milk Package 
provisions reflects that representatives of the Romanian dairy sector 
perceived a clear potential for more producer organisations (PO’s) in their 
territory (European Commission, 2016). Currently, only two PO’s are in 




7.40 Spain accounted for 4.5% of EU milk deliveries in 2017 with a 
production of 7.2 billion tonnes. Its exports of dairy products converted into 
milk equivalent (ME) represented 21.9% of the milk deliveries and 2% of EU 
dairy exports (CLAL, 2019). A summary of statistics for the dairy sector in 
Spain is presented in Table A.6 in the Annex, section 7.2.  
 
7.41 The Spanish total milk production was slightly above 7 million tonnes in 
2017, increasing 1.8% from the previous year.  
 
7.42 The production is located mainly in the northern area of Spain (81%), 
with a high concentration on the NorthWest regions of Galicia (38%) Asturias 
(8%), and Cantabria (6%). Likewise, the number producers is eminently 




7.43 The Spanish processing industry generated €8,640 millions of output 
value in 2015, that accounted for 1.8% of the total Spanish industrial 
production and 9.2% of the food and drink sector. The industrial sector 
comprissed 1,557 dairy business in 2015. Although, the ten biggest 





7.2 Dairy statistics by country 
 





2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 Change Period
(%)
Milk production area
  Number of cows ('000 head) 1,883 1,918 1,898 1,904 1,904 1,904 0.00 Jan-Dec 2018
  Milk production (1000 ton.) 15,088 15,447 14,931 15,443
  Delivery to dairies (1000 ton.) 14,818 15,210 14,708 15,157 12,694 12,716 0.17 Jan-Oct 2018
  Delivery to dairies (%) 98.21 98.47 98.51 98.15
     Protein (%) 3.28 3.32 3.40 3.42 3.4 3.4 Jan-Oct 2018
     Fat (%) 3.99 4.02 4.23 4.2 4.18 4.18 Jan-Oct 2018
Dairy products area (1000 ton.)
  Drinking milk 7,164 6,854 6,632 6,911 5,689 5,633 -0.98 Jan-Oct 2018
  Cream for direct consumption 308 326 290 307 255 284 11.37 Jan-Oct 2018
  Acidified milk 272 298 280 339 290 306 5.52 Jan-Oct 2018
  Butter 140 145 143 161 137 129 -5.84 Jan-Oct 2018
  Cheese from cow milk 408 434 442 457 380 396 4.21 Jan-Oct 2018
  Other fresh products 486 620 286 275
Exports (1000 ton.)
  Bulk milk 525 546 542 756
  Cheese 134 152 164 172
  Packed milk 96 98 83 68
  WMP 81 96 74 59
  SMP 44 51 41 56
  Whey 86 52 42 55
  Butter 51 50 65 55
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 35 34 43 54
  Other fresh products 82 82 70 59
Imports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 469 494 489 494
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 330 336 356 342
  Bulk milk 114 89 33 159
  Butter 95 106 99 90
  Whey 27 45 62 83
  Packed milk 77 86 88 80
  Condensed milk 38 39 46 49
  Infant milk formula 108 84 81 37
  SMP 35 37 39 36
  Cream  30 32 29 28









Figure A.1.2: UK – Farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 2007-18 
 
Source: European Commission 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
well as bacterial content). 
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 Change Period
(%)
Milk production area
  Number of cows ('000 head) 3,697 3,660 3,630 3,595 3,595 3,595 0.00 Jan-Dec 2018
  Milk production (1000 ton.) 25,728 25,820 25,139 25,008
  Delivery to dairies (1000 ton.) 25,309 25,375 24,453 24,629 20,507 20,584 0.38 Jan-Oct 2018
  Delivery to dairies (%) 98.37 98.28 97.27 98.48
     Protein (%) 3.23 3.22 3.22 3.25 3.23 3.21
     Fat (%) 3.94 3.97 4.01 4.01 3.98 3.98
Dairy products area (1000 ton.)
  Drinking milk 3,391 3,299 3,294 3,230 2,660 2,530 -4.89 Jan-Oct 2018
  Cream for direct consumption 474 474 479 503 413 406 -1.69 Jan-Oct 2018
  Acidified milk (yoghurts and other) 1,628 1,576 1,524 1,423 1,198 1,172 -2.17 Jan-Oct 2018
  Butter 445 447 435 412 342 350 2.34 Jan-Oct 2018
  Rendered butter and butteroil 56 54 50 46
  Other yellow fat dairy products 30 28 24 23
  Cheese from cow milk 1,796 1,783 1,732 1,723 1,588 1,571 -1.07 Jan-Nov 2018
Exports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 672 681 671 679
  Bulk milk 607 624 599 456
  Whey 425 421 431 405
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 454 423 417 392
  Packed milk 349 339 364 353
  Cream 243 257 201 188
  Infant formula 124 137 148 172
  Butter 96 105 97 97
Imports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 303 334 332 349
  Bulk milk 158 162 115 108
  Whey 466 422 415 421
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 87 82 83 84
  Packed milk 209 233 175 128
  Cream 163 144 161 163
  Infant formula 31 37 42 38
  Butter 205 198 204 214
Source: CLAL








Figure A.2.2 – France – Ratio farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 
2007-18 
 
Source: European Commission. 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
well as bacterial content). 
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E v o lu t io n R e c e n t d a ta
2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 C h a n g e P e r io d
(% )
M ilk  p r o d u c t io n  a r e a
  N u m b e r o f c o w s  ( '0 0 0  h e a d ) 2 5 5 2 5 1 2 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 0 .0 0 Ja n -D e c  2 0 1 8
  M ilk  p ro d u c tio n  (1 0 0 0  to n .) 1 ,8 7 6 1 ,9 4 1 1 ,9 1 8 1 ,9 6 8
  D e live ry  to  d a ir ie s  (1 0 0 0  to n .) 1 ,4 7 0 1 ,5 3 6 1 ,5 4 7 1 ,5 4 5 1 ,2 9 4 1 ,3 0 0 0 .4 6 Ja n -O c t 2 0 1 8
  D e live ry  to  d a ir ie s  (% ) 7 8 .3 6 7 9 .1 3 8 0 .6 6 7 8 .5 1
     P ro te in  (% ) 3 .2 3 3 .2 5 3 .2 3 3 .2 4 3 .2 2 3 .2 2
     F a t (% ) 3 .6 6 3 .6 3 3 .6 7 3 .6 6 3 .6 4 3 .6 5
D a ir y p r o d u c ts  a r e a  (1 0 0 0  to n .)
  D r in k in g  m ilk 4 3 3 4 6 2 5 1 3 5 2 6 4 3 4 4 4 0 1 .3 8 Ja n -O c t 2 0 1 8
  C re a m  fo r  d ire c t c o n s u m p tio n 6 .0 5 .4 6 .4 5 .9 4 .9 5 .0 2 .0 4 Ja n -O c t 2 0 1 8
  Ac id ifie d  m ilk  (yo g h u r ts  a n d  o th e r) 1 4 7 1 2 5 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 7 .6 5 Ja n -O c t 2 0 1 8
  B u tte r 1 0 1 0 8 9 7 9 2 6 .0 3 Ja n -O c t 2 0 1 8
  O th e r  ye llo w  fa t d a iry  p ro d u c ts 3 0 3 5 3 3 3 8
  C h e e s e  fro m  c o w  m ilk 7 4 8 0 8 0 8 7 0 7 3 7 3 0 .0 0 Ja n -O c t 2 0 1 8
E x p o r ts  (1 0 0 0  to n .)
  C h e e s e 2 1 2 4 2 8 3 2
  B u lk  m ilk 3 6 3 3 7 2 2 8 7 2 8 2
  W h e y 3 2 3 5 3 4 3 6
  Yo g h u r t a n d  b u tte rm ilk 4 .5 2 .8 4 .6 1 0
  P a c ke d  m ilk 2 2 3 1 3 7 5 9 #
  O th e r  p ro d u c ts 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 2
Im p o r ts  (1 0 0 0  to n .)
  C h e e s e 4 3 5 0 5 8 5 6
  B u lk  m ilk 1 7 1 2 9 .1 9 .7
  W h e y 3 2 3 5 3 4 3 6
  Yo g h u r t a n d  b u tte rm ilk 3 7 4 5 5 3 5 9
  P a c ke d  m ilk 7 8 8 5 5 9 6 4
  C re a m 9 .8 1 1 1 1 1 2
  O th e r  p ro d c u ts 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 0
  B u tte r 6 .6 7 .2 7 .4 6 .7
S o u rc e : C L AL








Figure A.3.2 – Hungary – Farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 2007-18 
 
Source: European Commission 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
well as bacterial content). 
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 Change Period
(%)
Milk production area
  Number of cows ('000 head) 1,831 1,826 1,822
  Milk production (1000 ton.) 11,907 11,426 11,886 12,199
  Delivery to dairies (1000 ton.) 11,037 11,161 11,524 11,950 9,997 10,124 1.27 Jan-Oct 2018
  Delivery to dairies (%) 92.69 97.68 96.95 97.96
     Protein (%) 3.35 3.36 3.38 3.45 3.44 3.41
     Fat (%) 3.77 3.80 3.83 3.79 3.76 3.77
Dairy products area (1000 ton.)
  Drinking milk 2,491 2,448 2,460 2,361 1,389 1,372 -1.22 Jan-Jul 2018
  Cream for direct consumption 121 164 131 129 72 79 9.72 Jan-Jul 2018
  Fermented milk 262 255 271 274 166 173 4.22 Jan-Jul 2018
  Butter 92 94 93 94 54 53 -1.85 Jan-Jul 2018
  Processed cheese 41 42 38 39
  Cheese from cow milk 982 1,017 1,005 1,053 616 654 6.17 Jan-Jul 2018
Exports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 329 358 389 415
  Whey powders 464 437 371 445
  Packed milk 9.6 24 53 71
  Condensed milk 7.1 7.8 7.4 5.9
  Bulk cream 9.9 4.9 13 17
  Packed cream 2.7 3 5.2 4.1
  Yoghurt 3.7 4.1 4.7 4.4
  Fermented milk 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.6
  SMP 6.2 12 5.2 5.8
  Butter 6.3 9.4 8.7 8.1
Imports (1000 ton.)
  Milk packed 490 461 425 385
  Bulk milk 1,596 1,556 1,338 1,138
  Condensed milk 17 16 21 19
  Bulk cream 73 74 72 68
  Packed cream 13 15 14 12
  Yoghurt 157 164 169 165
  Fermented milk 57 76 80 89
  Butter 64 74 65 61
  Cheese 508 511 518 510
  WMP 23 25 33 31
  SMP 66 78 69 72
  Whey powders 143 141 118 111
Source: CLAL








Figure A.4.2: Italy – Farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 2007-18 
 
Source: European Commission 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
well as bacterial content). 
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 Change Period
(%)
Milk production area
  Number of cows ('000 head) 2,248 2,134 2,130 2,153 2,153 2,153 0.00 Jan-Dec 2018
  Milk production (1000 ton.) 12,986 13,236 13,244 13,694
  Delivery to dairies (1000 ton.) 10,581 10,869 11,130 11,647 9,789 10,033 2.49 Jan-Oct 2018
  Delivery to dairies (%) 81.48 82.12 84.04 85.05
     Protein (%) 3.27 3.28 3.28 3.31 3.29 3.29
     Fat (%) 4.01 4.01 4.04 4.04 4.02 3.99
Dairy products area (1000 ton.)
  Drinking milk 1,590 1,650 1,658 1,733 1,436 1,456 1.39 Jan-Oct 2018
  Cream for direct consumption 252 255 259 265 224 221 -1.34 Jan-Oct 2018
  Acidified milk (yoghurts and other) 506 532 520 510 439 459 4.56 Jan-Oct 2018
  Butter 171 188 204 213 177 184 3.95 Jan-Oct 2018
  Rendered butter and butteroil 4.6 4.1 5.1 4.8
  Other yellow fat dairy products 28 25 24 25
  Cheese from cow milk 760 785 816 849 706 722 2.27 Jan-Oct 2018
  Processed Cheese 44 47 47 47
  Concentrated milk 36 35 33 32 26 26 0.00 Jan-Oct 2018
  Milk and cream powders 38 34 33 28 24 26 8.33 Jan-Oct 2018
  SMP 147 141 143 145 122 137 12.30 Jan-Oct 2018
  Buttermilk Powder 2.8 2.4 3.4 3.0
  Drinks with a milk base 109 94 84 79
  Whey 172 189 166 164
  Other fresh products 25 26 27 27
Exports (1000 ton.)
  Bulk milk 224 328 418 410
  Cheese 207 223 235 246
  Whey 257 239 222 218
  Packed milk 72 119 128 173
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 110 102 93 99
  SMP 118 109 80 90
  Cream 90 79 62 79
  Butter 36 41 45 61
  Infant formula 28 51 51 55
  Other products 46 40 40 65
Imports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 66 76 88 95
  Bulk milk 171 173 192 151
  Whey 92 73 61 90
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 34 39 63 73
  Condensed milk 81 70 65 51
  Cream 17 24 40 46
  SMP 23 26 38 35
  Butter 15 14 17 21
  WMP 14 10 13 13
  Infant formula 10 11 10 10









Figure A.5.1: Poland – Farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 2007-18 
 
Source: European Commission 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
well as bacterial content). 
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 Change Period
(%)
Milk production area
  Number of cows ('000 head) 1,188 1,191 1,193 1,175 1,175 1,175 0.00 Jan-Dec 2018
  Milk production (1000 ton.) 4,101 3,981 3,934 3,798
  Delivery to dairies (1000 ton.) 995 916 953 1,028 875 942 7.66 Jan-Oct 2018
  Delivery to dairies (%) 24.26 23.01 24.22 27.07
     Protein (%) 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.27 3.27 3.27 Jan-Oct 2018
     Fat (%) 3.77 3.75 3.78 3.79 3.77 3.77 Jan-Oct 2018
Dairy products area (1000 ton.)
  Drinking milk 252 261 276 290 235 253 7.66 Jan-Oct 2018
  Cream for direct consumption 60 67 70 66 55 55 0.00 Jan-Oct 2018
  Raw cream delivered to dairies 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1
  Acidified milk 172 191 198 211 177 180 1.69 Jan-Oct 2018
  Butter 11 11 12 12 9.9 8.7 -12.12
  Other yellow fat dairy products 27 30 31 29
  Cheese from cow milk 64 69 74 78 66 68 3.03 Jan-Oct 2018
  Processed Cheese 8.0 8.0 8.3 8.9
  Whey - - 0.5 -
  Other fresh products 3.3 1.5 1.1 1.2
Exports (1000 ton.)
  Bulk milk 26 21 28 37
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 10 14 19 28
  Packed milk 9.3 11 16 17
  Cheese 9 11 12 14
  Whey 6.2 4.7 4.5 6.1
  Cream 1.9 2.1 3 5.8
  Condensed milk 18 15 7.3 5
  Other products 2 1.8 1.7 2
Imports (1000 ton.)
  Bulk milk 72 95 130 138
  Cheese 40 49 64 74
  Packed milk 44 52 53 57
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 23 25 29 31
  Whey 12 12 14 16
  Condensed milk 1.2 4 6.8 14
  Cream 3.5 4.4 7.5 13
  Butter 6.8 9 11 11
  Other products 15 13 15 16
Source: CLAL
79 
Figure A.6.1:  Romania – Milk deliveries and dairy exports in milk equivalent. 
Source: CLAL 
Figure A.6.2 – Romania – Farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 
2007-18 
81.8 82.4 80.7 80.6 77.8
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Milk deliveries not exported Exported dairy products (ME)
Source: European Commission. 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
































































































































































































































































































































































2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 Change Period
(%)
Milk production area
  Number of cows ('000 head) 854 844 834 823 823 823 0.00 Jan-Dec 2018
  Milk production (1000 ton.) 6,780 7,029 7,124 7,229
  Delivery to dairies (1000 ton.) 6,651 6,794 6,886 7,022 5,868 5,975 1.82 Jan-Oct 2018
  Delivery to dairies (%) 98.10 96.66 96.66 97.14
     Protein (%) 3.22 3.22 3.24 3.25 3.23 3.26 Jan-Oct 2018
     Fat (%) 3.62 3.62 3.66 3.67 3.64 3.65 Jan-Oct 2018
Dairy products area (1000 ton.)
  Drinking milk 3,527 3,643 3,564 3,608 3,002 2,752 -8.33 Jan-Oct 2018
  Cream for direct consumption 104 144 130 123 102 85 -16.67 Jan-Oct 2018
  Acidified milk (yoghurts and other) 766 889 995 1,021 857 862 0.58 Jan-Oct 2018
  Butter 31 39 41 47 39 40 2.56 Jan-Oct 2018
  Concentrated milk 69 56 35 31
  Processed cheese 48 26 52 46
  Cheese from cow milk 168 211 224 261 219 212 -3.20 Jan-Oct 2018
  Milk and cream powders 21 10 27 9
  SMP 21 17 15 18
  Drinks with a milk base 386 421 435 -
  Other fresh products 131 136 287 213
Exports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 74 82 88 99
  Bulk milk 78 73 63 53
  Whey 48 55 59 55
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 101 117 124 131
  Packed milk 47 45 35 30
  Cream 75 83 109 107
  Infant formula 56 61 63 63
  SMP 7 12 8.9 34
  Condensed milk 24 26 26 29
  Other products 27 27 30 29
Imports (1000 ton.)
  Cheese 247 257 276 291
  Bulk milk 264 212 71 66
  Whey 62 63 57 59
  Yoghurt and buttermilk 220 182 180 196
  Packed milk 154 111 101 99
  Cream 16 15 18 16
  Infant formula 19 20 16 17
  SMP 44 51 47 60
  Condensed milk 21 14 17 15
  Other products 48 42 39 38









Figure A.7.2: Spain – Farm milk price/EU average farm milk price 2007-18 
 
 
Source: European Commission 
Note: Prices not adjusted by quality factors (i.e., fat and protein content as 
well as bacterial content). 
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This study investigates the impact of the implementation of mandatory written 
contracts (MWC) under the EU agricultural Common Market Organisation 
(CMO) regulation in raw milk price volatility among twelve member states 
using GARCH models. The results indicate that at least in three of the 
countries where MWC have been implemented (France, Hungary, and 
Slovakia) raw milk price volatility has decreased after its introduction. These 
findings are consistent with some of the aims of the 2012 Milk Package to 
improve negotiating practices and transparency in the supply chain. 
 
Keywords: Dairy, Mandatory Written Contracts, Agricultural policy, Volatility, 
GARCH model. 
 
JEL code: Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness - 




7.44 The 2018 UK government’s review for extending the remit of Groceries 
Code Adjudicator’s (GCA) to primary suppliers, determined that the UK 
agricultural sector suffered from important issues such as: (1) unbalanced 
bargaining power between producers and processors, (2) unfair or unclear 
contract terms extensively used throughout the supply chain, (3) late 
payments, and (4) diminished trust levels among stakeholders due to lack of 
transparency (UK Government, 2018). Raw milk is currently marketed in 
accordance with the Dairy Industry Code of Best Practice on Contractual 
Relationships (the Code) that was agreed in July 2012 between Dairy UK (the 
main association of UK processors), the National Farmers Union (NFU), and 
the NFU Scotland. This set of rules of voluntary adoption for the parties 
focuses mostly on the specification of the price.  
 
7.45 The Code states that milk price may be set by several means: (1) 
specifying a fixed price, (2) establishing a price notification system, or (3) any 
other pricing mechanism (NFU, 2012). The aims of the Code were 
commendable although its effectiveness has been limited, and dairy farmers 
have complained about the discretionary ability of processors to change the 
                                         
10 Agra-Lorenzo, F., Revoredo-Giha, C., Costa-Font, M., and Subramanian, A. (2019). The 
impact of the implementation of mandatory written contracts on milk price volatility within 
twelve European Union member states: A GARCH analysis.  Contributed Paper prepared for 
presentation at the 93rd Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, University 




price giving only a 30-day notice and transferring in this way the market risks 
to producers, whilst establishing notice periods of up to 12 months for the 
farmer to terminate a contract. In spite of the broad engagement in this 
voluntary Code throughout the chain, as the conclusions of the consultation on 
the extension of the remit of the GCA made clear, its use has not been 
enough to solve the formerly stated issues within the sector. As a result, the 
UK Government has announced plans to introduce mandatory written 
contracts (MWCs) in the UK dairy sector. MWCs were introduced in EU 
legislation in 2012 with the aim of improving contractual negotiation in the 
Supply chain. The UK government has referred explicitly to this regulation 
when announced its plans for introducing MWCs in the UK. In order to 
adequately inform the necessary secondary legislation to do that, the UK 
Government announced in February 2018 the call for a formal consultation 
process by March the same year (UK Government, 2018). This call has come 
to a standstill due to the Brexit process.  
 
7.46 MWCs have been implemented in some member states, but to our 
knowledge there is no evidence about their impact on milk price volatility. This 
study uses the Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model to evaluate whether milk price volatility has changed after the 
implementation of MWCs in twelve EU member states, using monthly data on 
farmgate milk prices sourced from the European Milk Market Observatory. 
 
7.47 The structure of the paper is organised as follows. First, the European 
Union agricultural regulation as to the MWCs and its level of implementation 
are briefly reviewed. Second, the empirical methodology used in this study is 
explained, with some references about the concept of volatility and the data 
utilised are shown. Third, the findings are presented and discussed. Finally, 
some remarks are offered to conclude. 
 
The Milk Package 
 
7.48 The price crisis that occurred within agricultural commodity markets in 
the period from 2007 to 2009 and the subsequent collapse of dairy product 
prices in 2008 and 2009, triggered a situation of high milk price volatility that 
put into question the viability of many European milk producers. This 
problematic situation prompted a thorough examination of the dairy sector by 
the European Union (EU).  
 
7.49 The assessment was commissioned to a group of experts set up in 
October 2009 (i.e., High-Level Expert Group on Milk (HLG)). The main aim of 
this group of experts was to produce proposals for a long-term common 
strategy for the EU milk sector. The HLG reported in 2010 and its main 
conclusion was that despite the heterogeneity of EU’s dairy supply chains, 
there existed throughout all the member states a growing imbalance in 




and disunited milk producers and an increasingly concentrated dairy 
processing industry.  
 
7.50 These situations of power imbalance had led to multiple examples of 
unfair commercial practices that had prompted issues of price transmission 
and consequently rigidities along the EU’s dairy supply chains. These rigidities 
had in turn exacerbated the impact of the 2008/09 increased raw milk price 
volatility upon milk producers (European Commission, 2012). Additionally, the 
HLG signalled that similar shocks might occur recurrently in the future due to 
the elimination of the EU milk quota system.  
 
7.51 The smooth phasing-out of milk quotas that had begun in 2009 to be 
fully completed in April 2015, was expected to pave the way for a more 
liberalised dairy market (European Commission, 2012). Accordingly, the 
European markets might be increasingly exposed to greater influence from 
international dairy commodity markets, which historically had suffered from 
higher volatility (Costa-Font and Revoredo-Giha, 2018; O'Connor and Keane, 
2011).  
 
7.52 The EU reacted by regulating the dairy sector in what has become 
known as the Milk Package. Based on the recommendations from the HLG, 
the Milk Package regulation was enacted in 2012 and later on integrated 
within the EU agricultural Common Market Organisation (CMO) regulation in 
2013 (European Commission, 2013). The CMO enabled member states the 
development into their internal law of a set of provisions aimed at reinforcing 
the position of dairy producers within the supply chain. These provisions 
constituted an especial designed framework for the European raw milk 
markets that extended over the European competition rules.  
 
7.53 The main content of the aforementioned provisions might be 
summarised as follows: (1) the implementation of MWCs to regulate the 
transactions between milk producers and first purchasers of raw milk was 
made available to member states in a discretionary basis; (2) compulsory 
recognition of new dairy producer’s organisations (PO) and their joint-
bargaining capability was imposed so as  to strengthen farmer’s bargaining 
position facing processors; (3) member states must encourage and facilitate 
the creation of inter-branch organisations (IBO) to improve knowledge and 
transparency by advisory and data publication activities; and finally, (4) in 
order to increase transparency as to the gathering of market data, the new 
regulation provided a legal basis to require monthly information on the amount 
of milk received from the first purchasers of milk. The European regulators 
considered that the use of MWCs could efficiently tackle price transmission 
issues by increasing awareness of market signals so as to better balance the 
supply and demand of milk (European Commission, 2012). It must be 




application when the same aspects of the contractual relationship were 
covered by the cooperative agreement.  
 
7.54 The extent of implementation of MWCs has been varied among EU 
members, due to the discretionary nature that this provision was given by the 
CMO regulation. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that by 2016, all the main EU 
producers with the exception of the UK, either had in place some sort of 
mandatory contracting regulation or delivered the majority of its production to 
processing cooperatives. Thus, regards countries where the majority of the 
processing industry is private, MWCs were in operation in France, Poland, 
Italy and Spain, whilst the German sector was regulated by pre-existent 
binding rules on contracts. In predominantly dominated co-operative countries 
such as, Ireland and Denmark, farmer owned cooperatives processed more 
than 95% of its raw milk production (European Commission, 2016).  
 
7.55 According to the last report on the operation of the EU Milk Package 
among the member states issued by the European Commission in November 
2016, compulsory contracts falling under article 148 of the CMO had been 
implemented in 13 member states, covering 41% of EU milk deliveries. The 
implementation has occurred more frequently on those countries whose 
processing cooperative sector is less pronounced (European Commission, 
2014). Table 1 lists the EU members that had made mandatory within their 
territory the use of written contracts for the marketing of raw milk according to 
the CMO regulation by November 2016 ordered by date of implementation.  
 






Member State Implementation Minimum Duration (C)ontracts / (O)ffers Compulsory
France Apr-11 5 years C + O
Italy Mar-12 1 year C + O
Spain Oct-12 1 year C + O
Lithuania Oct-12 - C
Hungary Dec-12 6 months C
Slovakia Dec-12 - C
Croatia Jun-13 6 months C
Cyprus Jun-13 1 year C
Portugal Jun-13 6 months C + O
Bulgaria Nov-13 6 months C
Romania Feb-14 6 months C + O
Slovenia Jan-15 1 year C
Poland Oct-15 - C




Agricultural markets volatility and its analysis 
 
7.56 Volatility is a directionless measure of the variability of a price over time 
(Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). Price movements are a sine qua non requirement 
embedded in the market’s clearing mechanism that enables demand and 
supply of any product to match. Price changes may reflect improvements in 
competitive advantages along the supply chain, as they may also disclose 
changing preferences on consumers that allow for efficient relocation of 
resources (O'Connor and Keane, 2011).  
 
7.57 The clearing mechanism usually generates well-stablished smooth price 
movements that reflect market’s economic core principles. However, 
unexpected large price variations may occur attending to other multiple 
factors, accordingly markets that behave in that manner are described as 
volatile (FAO and OECD, 2011). Impacts caused by excessive market 
volatility may be varied. Some examples could be among others; inefficient 
investment induced by risk averse behaviour, non-optimal production 
decision-making, or food security issues (FAO and OECD, 2011; Piot-Lepetit 
and M'Bareck, 2011).  
 
7.58 Most agricultural markets possess characteristics that may stimulate 
volatility. It is common that agricultural markets exhibit price-inelastic demand 
and supply functions where quantities supplied and demanded vary less than 
price in proportion. On the other hand, agricultural output may be hugely 
dependent on weather conditions. As a result of both circumstances small 
variations in production may prompt huge variations in price (Piot-Lepetit and 
M'Bareck, 2011). Consequently, observation of price volatility has been 
highlighted by international organisations and academics as an indispensable 
input tool for agricultural stakeholders and policymakers alike (FAO and 
OECD, 2011; Gilbert and Morgan, 2010; Yang, et al., 2001).  
 
7.59 There is abundant economic literature on the analysis of agricultural 
markets that has focused on the modelling of time-series of commodity prices 
(Piot-Lepetit and M'Bareck, 2011).  
 
7.60 The classical methodology used by econometricians to analyse time-
series consisted in decomposing a series of historical prices into four 
components; namely: trend, seasonal, cyclical and irregular component 
(Enders, 2015). The long-run evolution of the series would be explained by the 
trend component that corresponds with the economic fundamentals of the 
market showed by the evolution of its price’s mean. Recurrent wavelike price 
movements are captured by the seasonal and the cyclical components 
(Enders, 2015; Piot-Lepetit and M'Bareck, 2011).  
 
7.61 The cobweb theorem may be used to illustrate a cyclical movement in 




theorem, farmers would set their future supply in terms of the price in the 
current period oversupplying the market in the following period and triggering 
a fall in prices, subsequently the lag prompted between their decision and the 
actual demand of milk in the market results in the cycle until the market adjust 
in the long term (Hansen and Li, 2017). In the same way, seasonal 
movements may be explained in the dairy sector by the biology of the 
livestock and the variations of feeding costs and feeding systems throughout 
the climatic year (Bergmann et al., 2015). Finally, the irregular components or 
residuals of a time-series are stochastic and usually do not follow a defined 
pattern in the long-run (Enders, 2015). 
 
7.62 Price movements that follow trend, cyclical or seasonal components are 
predictable in the long-run, although they may lack interest for analysis in the 
short-run (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). Conversely, in spite of the stochastic 
nature of the irregular component often there exists a positive correlation 
between the consecutive values of this irregular component in the short-run. 
As Box et al. observed: “typically, adjacent observations are dependent” (Box, 
et al., 2016, p. 1). That is, normally a high value in a given period is followed 
by another high value in the following, as well as low values normally follow 
low values too. This stylised fact, proper of some time series data has been 
commonly referred to as volatility clustering (Box, et al., 2016). As a result, the 
analysis of this irregular component may be of great interest for short-run 
forecasting, and consequently for the analysis of price volatility (Enders, 
2015). This study will focus now on those models that enable to study the 
evolution of the irregular component of a time-series. 
 
7.63 One of the main assumptions of conventional econometric time-series 
models is that the variance of the irregular term must be constant. However, 
the existence of alternating periods of high and low volatility, often seen in 
some series of economic data, suggests that the assumption of constant 
variance (homoscedasticity) is not always appropriate (Box, et al., 2016). The 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model 
developed by Bollerslev (1986) extended the ARCH model introduced by 
Engle (Engle, 1982). It allows modelling the conditional variance when there 
exists volatility clustering in the series (Box, et al., 2016).  
 
7.64 In an Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) process, the 
unconditional mean remains constant over time whilst the conditional mean 
changes as a function of its own lagged values. Similarly, the ARCH model 
assumes that the unconditional variance of the disturbance process is 
constant whilst the conditional variance varies as an autoregressive function 
of past squared errors. Bollerslev generalised the ARCH model, then GARCH, 
by describing the conditional variance itself as an ARMA process, that is 
allowing for both autoregressive and moving average components in the 





7.65 The GARCH model requires the conditional variance to be positive, 
imposing non-negativity constraints on the estimated parameters 
(Kirchgässner, et al., 2013). In addition, the model also imposes stationarity 
constraints over the process that require the sum of the estimated parameters 
of the conditional variance to be lesser than 1 (O'Connor and Keane, 2011).  If 
the process is stable the conditional variance in the long-run will tend to equal 
the unconditional variance, but the model will still capture periods of high and 
low volatility. When the sum of the parameters exceeds 1, it suggests an 
explosive series that will deviate from the mean in the long run (Enders, 
2015). 
 
Data used in the analysis 
 
7.66 The data consisted of historical time-series of monthly averages prices 
of raw cow’s milk at real fat content paid to milk producers expressed in euros 
per 100 kilograms.11 The data were obtained from the European 
Commission’s Milk Market Observatory on October 2018 for all those EU 
members that had implemented in their internal regulation the utilisation of 
MWCs for the marketing of raw milk (European Commission, 2018). The 
period covered in this study extends from January 2003 to August 2018, 
except for Bulgaria and Romania, whose series start at January 2007 and 
2009 respectively due to data availability. Croatia was not been included in 
this analysis due to lack of data before the implementation of MWCs in June 
2013. 
 
7.67 The study of price volatility deals with the measurement of its variation 
over time. Hence, volatility analysis must focus on the second moment or 
variance of the probability distribution of the data set prices, or any derived 
transformation from it (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). Conventionally, volatility 
studies prefer to use the standard deviation of logarithmic prices as it provides 
a unit-free comparable measure. In addition, economic price time-series may 
exhibit trends which may affect price’s volatility beyond the influence of the 
proper price’s variance process. Measuring volatility as the standard deviation 
of price returns, that is the standard deviation of changes in logarithmic prices, 
eliminates this possible influence without imposing unwanted restrictions on 
the series to eliminate the trend (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). This study, 
therefore, used the log returns of monthly average prices of raw milk to asses 
how the implementation of MWCs has affected prices’ volatility. Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics of the series under observation.  
 
                                         
11 Note that because the purpose of the analysis was to analyse the volatility of the actual 
price received by the farmers, the price series were not standardised by solids content (e.g., 




7.68 In Table 2, it can be observed that all of the series exhibit the excess 
kurtosis, with all values larger than 3, that is a typical sign of volatility 
presence (O'Connor and Keane, 2011). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
7.69 Formal economic time-series models are developed under assumptions 
laid by probability theory. Since most economic time series data sets occur 
only once, in order to make statistical inferences from the data, each series is 
assumed to be just one observed realisation or sample of a stochastic data 
generating process. Therefore, it is assumed that the sample moments 
calculated from this data set will converge, when t tends to the infinite, against 
the moments of the population. However, only if the expected values of these 
moments remain constant for all t, that is the stochastic process is in statistical 
equilibrium (stationary), this assumption is meaningful (Kirchgässner, et al., 
2013). Consequently, the time-series data sets were checked for stationarity 
using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests 
(Yang, et al., 2001; Costa-Font and Revoredo-Giha, 2018). Table 3 shows the 
results from both tests for the log return of the price series. Both tests strongly 














Member State Observed period Obs. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Bulgaria 01/2007 - 08/2018 139 0.001979 0.1376 -0.1208 0.0362 0.3130 5.2293
Cyprus 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.002369 0.1279 -0.0489 0.0201 2.2720 14.2811
France 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.000457 0.1338 -0.2713 0.0472 -0.8059 8.4099
Hungary 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 -0.000172 0.2120 -0.1887 0.0444 0.2456 8.6420
Italy 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 -0.000085 0.0841 -0.0850 0.0208 0.1951 8.5564
Lithuania 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.002755 0.2183 -0.2921 0.0652 0.3023 6.2023
Poland 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.002962 0.1721 -0.0936 0.0349 0.4374 5.3478
Portugal 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 -0.000622 0.1442 -0.1308 0.0332 -0.3481 7.5433
Romania 01/2009 - 08/2018 115 0.001768 0.1221 -0.1277 0.0454 0.0870 3.2057
Slovakia 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.001589 0.1208 -0.1333 0.0333 -0.4040 7.3138
Slovenia 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.000002 0.0992 -0.0829 0.0250 -0.2432 5.3344
Spain 01/2003 - 08/2018 187 0.000286 0.1154 -0.0598 0.0226 0.9063 7.9236
Note: Data are expressed as li returns (Price t /Price t-1) of the average monthly prices of raw milk obtained as




Table 3: Non-stationarity tests 
 
 
Methodology used for the analysis 
 
7.70 Ever since their development GARCH models has been extensively 
utilised to analyse agricultural commodity markets volatility (Piot-Lepetit and 
M'Bareck, 2011; O'Connor and Keane, 2011; Gilbert and Morgan, 2010; Yang, 
et al., 2001). This study uses the GARCH model to test the hypothesis of raw 
milk price volatility changes in selected European dairy markets associated to 
the introduction of MWCs as part of the implementation of the EU-CMO 
regulation.  
 
7.71 The GARCH model allows doing so because it not only describes the 
time-varying pattern of price variability, but also the model enables the 
inclusion of explanatory variables in the specification of the conditional 
variance. Thereby, following Enders (2015) a dummy variable equal to 0 
before the introduction of the MWCs and equal to 1 after, was created and 
added to the model of each country under consideration. The statistical 
significance of the dummy would indicate whether the introduction of MWCs 
has affected or not raw milk price volatility, with its positive or negative sign 
indicating the direction of the change (Yang, et al., 2001). The general form of 
the ARMA-GARCH model with a dummy variable in the conditional variance 





Adj. t-Stat. Prob. t-Stat. Prob.
Bulgaria -8.26 0.00 -6.05 0.00
Cyprus -14.47 0.00 -14.47 0.00
France -10.46 0.00 -3.72 0.00
Hungary -11.62 0.00 -7.30 0.00
Italy -10.79 0.00 -7.15 0.00
Lithuania -6.78 0.00 -3.59 0.01
Poland -7.40 0.00 -4.61 0.00
Portugal -12.30 0.00 -3.61 0.01
Romania -6.32 0.00 -8.03 0.00
Slovakia -7.51 0.00 -5.23 0.00
Slovenia -8.23 0.00 -6.52 0.00
Spain -5.77 0.00 -3.89 0.00




𝑌𝑡 =  𝜇 +   ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑖 𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 +  𝑡               (1) 
𝑡 | Ω𝑡−1 ≈ 𝑡𝑑(0, ℎ𝑡)     (2) 







𝑗=1  + 𝛿𝐷𝑡                  (3) 
 
(1) Represents the mean equation of the model, where 𝑌𝑡 is the dependent 
variable, in this case the log return of raw milk prices; 𝑌𝑡−𝑖  are explanatory 
lagged values of the dependent variable; 𝑡−𝑗 are lagged error terms; 𝑡 is 
the error term; 𝜇,   and 𝜙 are parameters; and p and q are the lag lengths 
used. 
(2) Represents the error component 𝑡 conditional on the information available 
Ω at moment 𝑡 − 1. This error component is assumed to be a white-noise 
process with a mean equal to zero, a variance ℎ𝑡   that follows a Normal 
distribution, and uncorrelated residuals.  
(3) Finally, shows the structure of the conditional variance equation that 
accounts for the price volatility in the model; where ℎ𝑡 is the time-varying 
conditional variance of the error term; 𝑡−𝑖
2  are lagged squared residuals; 
ℎ𝑡−𝑗  are lagged values of the conditional variance; 𝐷𝑡 is the dummy 
variable added to detect the MWCs impact; 𝜔, 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑗 , and 𝛿 are parameters; 
and p and q are the lag lengths for the squared residuals of the error term 
and the lagged conditional variance.  
 
7.72 The sum of the parameters αi+ βj will express the degree of volatility 
clustering in the series. That is, the persistence of the volatility. The closer the 




7.73 Estimating models were selected following the three-stage Box-Jenkins 
strategy for univariate time-series (Box, et al., 2016). During the first stage the 
data were plotted and checked. The histograms show that the marginal 
distributions of all these series are leptokurtic, tending to have heavier tails 
than those of a normal distribution. This distributional feature which normally 
indicates the presence of volatility, is also confirmed by the Jarque-Bera test 
results which in all cases rejects the null hypothesis of normal distribution. On 
the other hand, each of the plotted log return values fluctuate around a stable 
mean level indicating that the time-series are stationary, the dotted line 
included in each chart indicates the date of MWCs implementation (O'Connor 
and Keane, 2011). 
7.74 According to the Box-Jenkins model selection strategy, it is preliminary 
to check for the presence of ARCH effects in the residuals of the modelled 
series. Consistently, an ARMA model was fitted to each of the observed time-
series and the residuals were checked for remaining heteroscedasticity using 
the ARCH Lagrange Multiplier test. The tests for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, 




heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the fitted ARMA models. In other words, 
the variance of the log-return of the prices in these series remained constant. 
These time-series were modelled using an ARIMA model, and in order to 
assess the influence of the implementation of MWCs over raw milk price 
variation, a Chow test for structural break in the implementation date of MWCs 
was carried out on all the homoscedastic series. Table 4, reports ARIMA-
model specifications, serial correlation tests of the residuals, and Chow test 
results. All the models are well specified according to the Ljung-Box Q-statistic 
test, and the ARCH LM tests could not reject the null of no-ARCH effects on 
the squared residuals. On the other hand, none of the Chow test could reject 
either the null hypothesis of no breaks on the date of implementation.  
 
Table 4: ARIMA models and Chow tests 
 
 
7.75 The rest of the time-series in which ARCH effects on the residuals were 
detected, namely the series from France, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain, were subsequently modelled as GARCH processes 
following the Box-Jenkins approach for the selection of the models. The goal 
of the second stage of the Box-Jenkins method is to select a parsimonious 
and stationary model with a good fit. Parsimony entails that the model fits the 
data well using the minimum number of coefficients.  
 
7.76 The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions were used as 
guidance for selecting the lags of the AR and MA processes to be included, 
and models were then selected in terms of their goodness of fit using the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and of the stability and non-negativity of 
the parameters required by the GARCH model (Enders, 2015). Finally, a well 
specified GARCH model requires the estimated residuals to be uncorrelated 
and free of ARCH effects (Kirchgässner, et al., 2013). Consistently with that, 
the standardized residuals were checked for remaining serial correlation on 
the mean equation using the Ljung-Box Q-statistic test, and any remaining 
ARCH effect on the residuals of the variance equation was checked using the 
Member State Mean Mean SD AIC LB Q-Stat ARCH LM Chow test
Specification.
Bulgaria AR(1) 0.00198 0.04 -4.03 Q(5) 0.688 2.118 1.107
MA(2) Q(10) 0.154 0.148 0.349
Cyprus AR(1) 0.00237 0.02 -4.97 Q(5) 0.136 0.003 0.242
MA(6) Q(10) 0.426 0.959 0.785
Italy AR(1) 0.00009 0.02 -4.97 Q(5) 0.823 0.482 0.569
MA(1) Q(10) 0.556 0.486 0.636
Poland AR(1) 0.00296 0.03 -4.24 Q(5) 0.116 0.064 0.427
MA(6) Q(10) 0.338 0.799 0.734
Portugal AR(2) 0.00062 0.03 -3.99 Q(5) 0.520 2.668 0.089
Q(10) 0.260 0.103 0.915
Romania AR(1) 0.00177 0.05 -3.72 Q(5) 0.531 0.012 0.122




ARCH Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and the Ljung-Box test of the squared 
residuals (Box, Jenkins, Reinsel, and Ljung, 2016; Enders,  2015). 
 
7.77 Table 5 reports GARCH model especifications and test results. Both, 
the p-values of the ARCH LM tests and the Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests of the 
squared residuals, show that the null-hypotheses of non-ARCH effect on the 
residuals of the variance cannot be rejected in any of the models, nor there 
remain serial correlation on the squared residuals, signalling a good 
estimation for all the variance equations. Likewise, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic of 
the residuals rejects any remaining correlation, indicating a good estimation of 
the mean equation for all the estimated models too. 
 
Table 5: ARCH/GARCH model specifications 
 
 
7.78 Finally, table 6 shows the estimated parameters of the conditional 
variance equations for each time-series. The time-varying variance of the raw 
milk prices has been confirmed in all the series, since at least one or both of 
the GARCH parameters (𝛼𝑖  𝑜𝑟 𝛽𝑗) that account for the volatility have been 
identified as highly statistically significant at the 1% level. The persistence of 
the volatility clustering effect that is obtained by the addition of both 
parameters, has been varied ranging from 0.20 (France) to 0.90 (Spain). Of 
importance in this model is the 𝛿 parameter that signals the impact of the 
dummy variable that account for the MWCs implementation effect in each 
country. Five out six of the models (with the exception of the Slovenian model) 
have identified, as it would be expected according to the EU theoretical 
presumptions, a negative effect or reduction on price volatility after the 
implementation of the mandatory contracts. In three of these five time-series, 
the estimated parameters have been also found significant at the 1% level; 







Member State Mean Cond. Variance AIC R
2
LB Q-stat LB Q
2
-stat ARCH LM
France AR(9) ARCH (1) -3.64 0.22 Q(5) 0.12 Q(5) 0.61 0.60
MA(1,5) Q(10) 0.24 Q(10) 0.31
Hungary AR(1) ARCH (1) -3.84 0.15 Q(5) 0.22 Q(5) 0.50 0.06
Q(10) 0.14 Q(10) 0.82
Lithuania AR(1,2) ARCH (1) -3.30 0.39 Q(5) 0.30 Q(5) 0.82 0.51
MA(7) Q(10) 0.43 Q(10) 0.75
Slovakia AR(1) ARCH (1) -4.91 0.35 Q(5) 0.28 Q(5) 0.61 0.07
MA(2,3) Q(10) 0.12 Q(10) 0.89
Slovenia ARCH (1) -5.02 0.28 Q(5) 0.24 Q(5) 0.82 0.41
MA(1,2,3,4) Q(10) 0.11 Q(10) 0.88
Spain AR(1,3,4) GARCH (1,1) -5.61 0.59 Q(5) 0.10 Q(5) 0.58 0.91









7.79 This study investigated the impact of the implementation of mandatory 
written contracts (MWC) under the EU agricultural Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) regulation in raw milk price volatility in twelve member 
states using GARCH models. The results provide evidence that in three of 
these Members States (France, Hungary, and Slovakia) milk price volatility 
decreased after the internal implementation of MWCs.  
 
7.80 However, it should be highlighted that the CMO regulation included not 
only prescriptions about the introduction of MWC but also other 
recommendations in order to improve the position of dairy farmers in the 
supply chain. For instance, dairy farmers’ POs and IBO aimed at improving 
producers’ bargaining position and transparency within the dairy supply chain. 
Since all of these measures were available at the same time, it may be 
controversial to attribute the decreasing volatility effect at the mere 
introduction of the contracts.  
 
7.81 In the rest of the countries under consideration the results found were 
varied, with raw milk prices’ variance either found to be constant or to vary in a 
non-significant manner over the period studied. This could be due to a variety 
of causes. It is known for instance that written contracts were commonly used 
within the Italian dairy industry long before the introduction of the CMO 
regulation, as it could be also the case in other countries.  
 
7.82 In addition, modelling limitations should be also taken under 
consideration when examining these results. The introduction of a dummy 
variable indicating the implementation of a new regulation assumes that the 
effects over the series start from that point onwards, however such effect may 
take time to materialise and produce the expected effects. Consequently, 
Coefficient Member State
France Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Spain
𝛚 0.00176 0.00165 0.00152 0.00041 0.00026 0.00003
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0420
𝛂 0.20 0.35 0.32 0.50 0.33 0.14
p-value 0.0083 0.0005 0.0036 0.0001 0.0062 0.0209
𝛃 - - - - - 0.76
p-value - - - - - 0.0000
𝛂 + 𝛃 0.20 0.35 0.32 0.50 0.33 0.90
𝛅 -9.40 -13.18 -1.24 -2.72 1.08 -0.11
p-value 0.0052 0.0000 0.7278 0.0000 0.1722 0.1402
Note:
  𝛚 , 𝛂 ,  𝛃 , and  𝛅  , are parameters:
  𝛚 is the intercept;  𝛂 accounts for the squared residuals of the error term; and 𝛃  accounts for  the lagged values of
  the conditional variance. 𝛂 + 𝛃 signals the persistence of the volatility. The closer to 1 the greatest the persistence.
  𝛅 reflects the impact of the dummy variable and expresses the MWC elasticity of price returns.




models may fail to detect the significance in that single point whilst the 
underlying process is effectively being affected. It is plausible for this reasons 
that perhaps this effect could be better detected using recursive estimation 
techniques (Enders, 2015).  
 
7.83 Finally, this study has focused on the analysis of individual country time-
series. However, within the EU there exist singular milk buyers that operate in 
different countries at the same time and the import-export of raw milk is also 
an extended practice throughout some parts of the EU. Consequently, to 
undertake a multivariate time-series analysis of raw milk price volatility 
including a variety of interrelated countries in a single panel data model may 





7.4 Rules set by the Milk Package regarding MWCs 
 
The rules set by the Milk Package (Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013) 
 
Member States can make the use of formal written contracts compulsory. 
Although, contracts will remain voluntary at EU level. Co-operatives will be 
exempt from any requirement for compulsory contracts at a member state 
level. 
 
1. Where a member state decides that every delivery of raw milk between a 
farmer and processor shall be covered by a written contract, that contract 
will fulfil the following conditions:  
a. The price payable, which will be static and set out in the contract or 
vary only on factors that are set out in the contract (i.e. a formula or 
linked to specified market indicators). 
b. Volume which may, or shall be delivered and timing of deliveries.  
c. Duration of the contract, with termination clauses. 
2. A contract will not be required if the farmer supplies a co-op – but only if 
the co-op statutes contain provisions with the same objective as the 
Commission’s ‘contract requirements’. 
3. The Commission proposes to allow producer organisations to negotiate 
contract terms, including price jointly, or for some of its members’ 
production to a dairy:  
a. POs will be subject to quantitative limits at EU and member state 
level. 
b. The PO must notify the competent authority of the member state to 
register as a legal entity. 
c. Strict clauses are set out in the regulation that will restrict the activity 
of the PO so as to prevent price fixing, and other distortions of 
competition.    
4. Member States may also recognise interbranch organisations which:  
a. have formally requested recognition and are made up of 
representatives of economic activities linked to the production of 
raw milk and linked to at least one of the following stages of the 
supply chain: processing of or trade in, including distribution of, 
products of the milk and milk products sector;  
b. are formed on the initiative of all or some of the representatives 
referred to in point ‘a’;  
c. carry out, in one or more regions of the Union, taking into account 
the interests of the members of those interbranch organisations 
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